Improving remedy design in merger control for the benefit of consumers
Submitting Institution
University of East AngliaUnit of Assessment
Economics and EconometricsSummary Impact Type
PoliticalResearch Subject Area(s)
Economics: Economic Theory, Applied Economics
Summary of the impact
Competition authorities (CAs) often regulate mergers through the
imposition of remedies. The
research conducted by Lyons and Davies shows that the conventional
emphasis on structural
remedies does not adequately safeguard consumers' interests. Their
recommendations have been
adopted by CAs and are now enshrined in revised guidelines on merger
remedies used by the
European Commission and the UK Competition Commission. Their research was
instrumental in
changing guidelines published in 2008 on licensing agreements used in
mergers involving IP
Rights, and drawing attention to the necessary conditions for effective
behavioural remedies. This
has, for example, enabled consumer access to pharmaceuticals at lower
prices.
Underpinning research
Remedies are at the heart of an effective merger control regime, yet they
had previously been the
subject of very little academic research before this work by Bruce Lyons
and Steve Davies (L&D),
professors at the University of East Anglia, where Davies has worked since
1981 and Lyons since
1985.
Their research was motivated by the observation that mergers are rarely
prohibited when reviewed
by a competition authority. If competitive problems are found, they are
ten times more likely to be
allowed subject to 'remedy' than they are to be prohibited. It is,
therefore, crucial to ensure that
these remedies are effective in safeguarding the consumer. The standard
remedy is an
undertaking to divest a particular set of assets, providing access or
license rights. With the latter, a
key issue is the price at which access is provided or rights are licensed.
L&D began their work on EU merger control and remedies in 2002 (award
[A] in section 3). In
summer 2003, they were awarded European Commission funding for research
into how remedies
could be better specified in EU merger control [B]. As the research
expanded, it was funded by the
ESRC (through the University's Centre for Competition Policy [C]). The
research developed a
novel methodology for appraising merger remedies, including the
development of simplified
simulations. A key part of the research consisted of detailed quantitative
case studies of a number
of mergers, including ex post reviews of `what happened next'. L&D's
focus was on paper & paper
products and pharmaceuticals mergers. This was in order to understand the
breadth of issues from
relatively homogeneous products to high research-and-development
innovation markets. Access to
confidential data normally inaccessible to academics was facilitated by an
in-house descriptive
study of problems of remedy implementation conducted simultaneously by the
EC's Directorate
General for Competition. The research drew on earlier empirical studies on
contracts and
transaction costs ([1], [2]) and weaknesses in EU merger control [3].
Key results of L&D's pioneering research [4] led to practical
recommendations including:
a) Licensing contracts can be an ineffective remedy because they result
in a long-term
relationship with a competitor who can raise the licensee's costs. L&D
concluded that
licences should specify clear and well defined terms (including duration
and payments)
that do not result in anticompetitive pricing.
b) There could be disproportionately high transaction costs in applying
remedies,
particularly in relation to small businesses (e.g. a single pharmaceutical
in a small
national market, where there may be very few potential buyers). L&D
recommended
that remedy packages should be carefully designed to address issues of
buyer fit and
transaction costs. Behavioural remedies (e.g. price commitments) would
sometimes be
the best option for isolated markets or small countries, and where large
buyers have an
incentive to monitor.
c) Divestiture trustees are instructed by firms, with the Commission's
approval. L&D found
a principal-agent problem that, in practice, impeded the restoration of
competition. L&D
concluded that the Competition Authority should instruct Trustees
directly.
References to the research
Publications:
(numbers in curly braces are citations from Google Scholar, accessed 1
July 2013):
[1] B. Lyons, "Contracts and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of
Transaction Cost Theory",
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy (1994), 3(2), 257-78,
{132}.
Reprinted in O. E. Williamson and S. Masten (eds.) The Economics of
Transaction Costs
(1999), Elgar Critical Writing Readers.
[2] B. Lyons, "Specialised Technology, Economies of Scale, and the
Make-or-buy Decision: A Test
of Transaction Cost Theory", Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organization (1995), 431-43,
{131}.
Reprinted in C. Menard (ed) The International Library of the New
Institutional Economics vol.4,
ch.13, (2004), Edward Elgar.
[3] B. Lyons, "Reform of European Merger Policy", Review of
International Economics (2004),
12(2), 246-61, {36}.
[4] S. Davies and B. Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in
the EU: Assessing the
Consequences for Competition, Edward Elgar (2007),
{32}.
Research grants supporting this research and reflecting its quality:
[A] European Commission DG Enterprise (€13,750) for the project
"Post-merger study: efficiency
effects of a global merger in the iron ore industry" (S. Davies and B.
Lyons, 2002).
[B] European Commission DG Enterprise (€78,600) for the project
"Theoretical and empirical
analyses of the competitiveness impact of remedies in EC Merger Control"
(S. Davies and B.
Lyons, 2003).
[C] ESRC award for c£8m (2004-14) for a Centre for Competition Policy (S.
Davies, M. Hviid, B.
Lyons and C. Waddams, 2004).
Details of the impact
The research by L&D has influenced policy on merger remedies made by
competition authorities
across Europe; specifically:
- European Commission (DG Competition)
- UK Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading.
The focus here is on documented evidence of influence on merger remedy
guidelines - in
particular on the specification of licensing agreements used as a remedy
in mergers involving
Intellectual Property Rights. This follows from research finding a) in
section 2. It is highlighted
because L&D's influence is clearly observable: the European Commission
(EC) incorporated their
recommendation into its 2008 guidelines.
The final revised `Notice on Merger Remedies' was published in October
2008 ([I] in section 5).
L&D were the only respondents to comment on the inadequacy of
`reasonable and non-
discriminatory (RAND)' licensing in the draft guidelines [II]. In direct
response to L&D's criticism,
backed by their detailed research of pharmaceuticals market, the draft
section 65 in the final Notice
was replaced by a requirement for precise formulas:
"It has to be further ensured that the terms and conditions under which
the licences are
granted do not impede the effective implementation of such a licence
remedy. If no clearly
determined terms and conditions for the granting of licences exist in the
market at stake,
the terms and conditions, including the pricing, should be clearly
apparent from the
commitments (e.g. by way of pricing formulas). An alternative solution may
be to rely on
royalty-free licences." Wording to this effect was also added to section
38.
In order to understand how this is a major impact, we trace how L&D's
research came to the
attention of those responsible for determining EC policy. The EC had
consulted on the revised draft
Notice on Merger Remedies [III]. Section 65 of the draft included the
following extract relating to
licensing terms:
"As regards the terms and conditions, it may be appropriate to rely on
commonly accepted
licensing terms in the industry at stake, i.e., if appropriate, on RAND as
used in some
standardisation processes".
L&D's research had found that similar terms such as `adequate
compensation' and `normal and
non-discriminatory commercial conditions' "... are open to abuse leading
to ineffective remedies.
Much clearer guidance is necessary to determine commercial terms and
licence duration such that
competition will be fully restored" [4].
L&D submitted evidence on this to the consultation ([IV]), with
extracts from [4] including:
"Insufficient attention was also paid in several cases to licensing terms,
concerning royalties,
arbitration, and duration. While terms like `adequate compensation',
`supply the product at a price
which will ensure that the third party distributor can compete effectively
in the market', and `normal
and non-discriminatory commercial conditions' are referred to in
decisions, these are insufficient to
ensure an effective remedy."
The Commission draft [III] was changed in the final Notice [I] as a
result of the submission [IV]
based on L&D's research published in [4]. The fact that this was a
direct result of L&D's research is
corroborated by Dr Svend Albaek (adviser of the Chief Competition
Economist's Team in the
European Commission) in the extract reproduced in [a]. There is further
evidence that Commission
practice has actually changed to the benefit of consumers as a
result. The required licensing
remedies must now be "irrevocable, exclusive and royalty free" (e.g.
merger cases Teva/Barr
M.5295; Abbott/Solvay M.5661).
While impact on UK competition guidelines is less straightforward to
document, it is no less
significant. Lyons was a part-time member of the UK Competition Commission
(2002-11) and,
because of his research on merger remedies, was invited to be a founding
member of its
Remedies Standing Group (2002-06) and to join its Economics Advisory
Committee (2008-11).
During this period he was able to influence Commission thinking, and its
revised guidelines
(October 2008, [V]). As a result, Lyons has input his research knowledge
into discussions and
commented on drafts prior to consultation. This is acknowledged by Peter
Freeman CBE, QC,
Chairman of the Competition Commission 2006-11 in the extract reproduced
in [b].
Because of his research on merger remedies, Lyons was also invited to
give seminars on this topic
to competition authorities across Europe. He disseminated his knowledge on
remedy design, and
likely influenced subsequent actions:
- March 2006 - Central European Competition Initiative in Budapest
- January 2008 - UK Competition Commission
- May 2009 - Norwegian Competition Authority, Bergen
- Sept 2010 - Norwegian Competition Law Association, Sandefjord
Finally, in addition to the impact of L&D research on merger remedy
guidelines, one of the novel
simulation methodologies developed in [4] has been adopted by the OFT for
screening relevant
mergers and justifying actual decisions ([c]).
Sources to corroborate the impact
I. Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC)
No
139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 - 2008/C 267/01
(October 2008)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:267:0001:0027:EN:PDF
II. EC consultation responses (including by L&D) can be seen at:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/merger_remedies.html
III. Original draft of the above notice (April, 2007), which was later
modified as a result of
L&D's research
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/draft_remedies_notice.pdf
IV. L&D's response in particular:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/files_remedies/lyons_davies.pdf
V. Merger Remedies: Competition Commission Guidelines - CC8, November
2008
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/rules_and_guide/pdf/cc8.pdf
Extracts from testimonials (full text is available):
[a] Svend Albaek (27/03/13) - antitrust adviser to the Chief Competition
Economist in the
European Commission (current position). "The work of Steve Davies and
Bruce Lyons on
merger remedies (published in a book on Mergers and Merger Remedies in the
EU) was
known to the staff of the DG Competition at the time of drafting the final
version of the
Commission's Merger Remedies Notice. The contribution of Davies and Lyons
proved very
helpful, in particular in highlighting the pros and cons of different
pricing structures for licences."
[b] Peter Freeman (28/11/12) - former Chairman of the UK Competition
Commission (until 2011).
"The CC was fortunate in having direct access to the advice and expertise
of Professor Lyons,
who played an active role in the formulation of the CC's thinking,
particularly on the design and
use of divestiture remedies and the need for mixed packages of behavioural
and structural
measures. Although the CC clearly also had access to advice and assistance
from a variety of
sources, it is likely that Professor Lyons' work had a significant impact
on the CC's output and
effectiveness in this important field of activity."
[c] Amelia Fletcher (28/03/2012) - former Chief Economist of the OFT
(through mid-2013). L&D's
work "on analysing mergers in Cournot markets with capacity constraints
has been drawn upon
in a number of OFT merger cases, including Prince Minerals/Castle (2009)
and Kingspan/CRH
(2010)".