Insights from and Response to the Financial Crisis
Submitting Institution
University of EdinburghUnit of Assessment
Economics and EconometricsSummary Impact Type
EconomicResearch Subject Area(s)
Economics: Applied Economics, Econometrics
Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services: Banking, Finance and Investment
Summary of the impact
John Moore's Edinburgh-based research (1993-) on the role of trust and
liquidity in the amplification and propagation of business cycles has
informed both the understanding of, and the policy response to, the recent
financial crisis in central banking circles around the world. His insight
into the self-reinforcing effect of a decline in asset prices via the collateral
multiplier has been instrumental in making sense of the crisis.
Moore's work has also provided intellectual underpinning for the
unconventional monetary policy — quantitative easing — that
central banks, including the Federal Reserve (over US$1.5 trillion) and
the Bank of England (over £375 billion) have undertaken in response to the
crisis.
Underpinning research
Context: Moore's research on trust, liquidity and the
aggregate economy evolved out of a longstanding collaboration with
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (now at Princeton University). It started during
Moore's first spell at The University of Edinburgh as a part-time
Professor in 1993-95. He returned in 2000 as the George Watson's and
Daniel Stewart's Professor of Political Economy, a full-time position
he continues to hold. This case study is based on two, closely related,
pieces of research both of which were predominantly produced in
Edinburgh.
Moore's first paper with Kiyotaki, "Credit Cycles", was originally
published as a University of Edinburgh Department of Economics Discussion
Paper in 1995. It subsequently appeared in the Journal of Political
Economy in 1997. This paper developed the idea that, in the presence
of financial frictions that limit the amounts that economic agents can
credibly borrow, collateral acts as a key lubricant to the financial
system. Kiyotaki and Moore show that there is a powerful interaction
between these credit constraints and aggregate economic activity over the
business cycle. In particular, since collateral sustains borrowing, and
thereby investment, changes in the price of collateralized assets can have
a profound effect on the ability of economic agents to borrow and invest.
In an economy in which debt sustains debt, a downward spiral can emerge
following a recessionary shock: in a downturn asset prices fall, which
reduces collateral values, suppresses investment and asset demand, thus
reducing asset prices still further. Moreover, the future knock-on effects
of falls in net worth and investment make matters even worse because they
too are reflected in reductions in today's asset prices. Through this new
channel, the collateral multiplier, small temporary shocks - such as those
that accompany business cycles — can be amplified and propagated through
the economy.
Kiyotaki and Moore resumed their research agenda on trust and liquidity
at the time of Moore's return to Edinburgh. The initial thoughts on their
follow-up project — part funded by Moore's Leverhulme Research
Professorship — "Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy" were
first put on paper in 2001 when they formed the basis of one of the
prestigious Clarendon Lectures given by Moore at Oxford
University. This paper presents a theory of the aggregate economy in which
fiat money has value because of its liquidity. When economic agents cannot
completely trust each other to repay their debts, money can allow them to
borrow and lend across time, financing investments that otherwise would
not happen. Thus, even though money is intrinsically valueless as an
asset, its liquidity has value in a world of limited trust. Kiyotaki and
Moore show that, in this environment, government policies that change the
mix of assets held in the economy can help to alleviate the amplitude of
business cycles. They show, in particular, that a policy that exchanges
illiquid private assets for liquid fiat money will stimulate the economy,
a policy considered unconventional at the time of the paper's writing.
References to the research
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1995) "Credit Cycles", Department of
Economics Discussion Paper, University of Edinburgh.
Available as a scanned PDF. The original is in UoE Main Library. http://tinyurl.com/o7yrm5e
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997) "Credit Cycles", Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 2, pp. 211-248. (Awarded the Stephen
A. Ross Prize in Financial Economics in 2010) DOI: 10.1086/262072
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J., "Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary
Policy". Moore's 2nd Clarendon Lecture, Oxford University (27
November, 2001). Available from HEI
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (2012) "Liquidity, Business Cycles, and
Monetary Policy," NBER Working Paper No. 17934. (Extensively rewritten,
with significant added material relative to the Clarendon Lecture.
Revision invited by the Journal of Political Economy)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17934
Details of the impact
The collateral multiplier channel, first identified in the paper "Credit
Cycles", foreshadowed important aspects of the chain of events witnessed
recently. The amplification and propagation of business cycles through the
feedback mechanism in asset prices via the collateral resembles the sharp
deterioration in financial intermediaries' balance sheets during the
crisis. For that reason, this insight was an important input into
policymaking discussions within central banks during the crisis.
In order to maximise the impact of his work, Moore gave a series of
invited lectures in the Bank for International Settlements (2008), Banque
de France (2008), Bundesbank (2008), Sveriges Riksbank (2009), Banco
Central de Uruguay (2009) and the Bank of England (2011). The insights
presented in these talks, as well as direct access to his written work,
have had considerable influence on their audience. For example, in an
email to Prof Michael Elsby (UoE), an economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York explicitly notes that he was invited to participate in
policy discussions in the Bank as a result of his familiarity with
Kiyotaki and Moore's work:
"In the policy work that I've done last year, the reason why I was
involved was that I was working on Kiyotaki-Moore. So, it definitely had a
policy impact." [see 5.1 below]
Closer to home, an Executive Director of the Bank of England certifies
that
"Moore's papers, "Credit Cycles" (...) and "Liquidity, Business Cycles
and Monetary Policy" (...) are both seminal pieces of work which have
influenced the thinking of the Bank of England and other central banks in
operating monetary and macroprudential policy during the crisis and
beyond." [5.2]
The influence of the paper was a key factor in its being awarded the
prestigious Ross Prize in Financial Economics ($100 000) in 2010. The
citation, entitled "The Impact of "Credit Cycles" by Kiyotaki and
Moore", notes in particular that:
"This is a landmark paper for the literature... The insights of this
literature have been essential in understanding the current crisis and the
"lost decade" in Japan." [5.3]
This influence has also percolated into the public debate. An article in
The Economist criticising economists for the inability of their
models to engage with the crisis triggered a debate initiated by Nobel
Laureate Robert Lucas. In a piece by Markus Brunnermeier, Kiyotaki and
Moore are cited as economists who have provided useful models:
"Research by Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler, Nobu Kiyotaki and John Moore,
Rick Mishkin and other macroeconomists provided helpful policy guidance,
exactly because their models emphasise the importance of financial
frictions for the macroeconomy." [5.4]
Similarly, in a prominent article criticising the economics literature
for its irrelevance to the crisis, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman highlights
the Kiyotaki-Moore agenda as an important exception:
"There were some exceptions. One line of work, ... A related line of
work, largely established by my Princeton colleague Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and
John Moore ..., argued that prices of assets such as real estate can
suffer self-reinforcing plunges that in turn depress the economy as a
whole." [5.5]
This view was echoed by David Romer at a 2011 conference organised by the
International Monetary Fund on post-crisis macro policy:
"I am not claiming that modern macroeconomics in general has not been
valuable. To give just one example, empirical and theoretical work on
credit-market imperfections (for example, Bernanke, 1983, Bernanke and
Gertler, 1989, and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) offers important insights
into financial crises and very likely informed the policy response." [5.6]
Beyond enriching our understanding of the financial crisis, Moore's
research also presaged policy responses that could counteract the severe
recessions exacerbated by financial frictions. Kiyotaki and Moore showed
that an injection of liquidity into the economy can help mitigate the
adverse effects of a financial crisis. From this insight emerged a highly
unconventional piece of policy advice: conduct open market operations that
exchange illiquid assets for liquid ones. This policy resembles important
aspects of the "quantitative easing" conducted by the Federal Reserve (and
the Bank of England) during the crisis. The impact of "Liquidity, Business
Cycles, and Monetary Policy" was acknowledged by Charles Evans, President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (reinforcing the comment from the
Bank of England above). In a speech, delivered at the peak of the crisis,
he makes frequent reference to the paper, noting in particular that:
"[O]ur Term Securities Lending Facility, which the Fed implemented in
mid-March, roughly corresponds to the Kiyotaki and Moore recommendations."
[5.7]
Sources to corroborate the impact
Archived links available at www.wiki.ed.ac.uk/display/REF2014REF3B/UoA+18
5.1 Research economist, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Corroborates
the quote in Section 4, full statement on file.
5.2 Executive Director, Bank of England. Corroborates the quote in
Section 4, full statement on file.
5.3 Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J., "The impact of "Credit Cycles" FARFE
Citation.
http://tinyurl.com/o957sfx
5.4 Markus Brunnermeier, (Princeton, advisor to the Bundesbank, IMF and
NY Fed) "Lucas roundtable: Mind the frictions", The Economist Free
Exchange, August 6 2009.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/08/markus_brunnermeier_is_edward
or http://tinyurl.com/lq2aaw3
5.5 Paul Krugman "How did economists get it so wrong?" New York Times,
September 2, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
or http://tinyurl.com/kz8y3xm
5.6 David Romer (UC Berkeley) "What Have We Learned about Fiscal Policy
from the Crisis?" IMF Conference on Macro and Growth Policies in the Wake
of the Crisis, March 2011. http://tinyurl.com/oo4opla
or http://tinyurl.com/kckuk6c
5.7 Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
"Challenges that the Recent Financial Market Turmoil Places on our
Macroeconomic Toolkit" Swiss National Bank Research Conference Zurich,
Switzerland, September 19, 2008.
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/speeches/2008/9.19_snb_speech.cfm
or
http://tinyurl.com/nxhpadg