National Security and Ministerial Responsibility: Shaping and Influencing Government Bills
Submitting Institution
University of GlasgowUnit of Assessment
LawSummary Impact Type
PoliticalResearch Subject Area(s)
Law and Legal Studies: Law
Summary of the impact
Professor Adam Tomkins of the University of Glasgow provides
research-based evidence and advice to the House of Lords Select Committee
on the Constitution, serving as one of their legal advisers since 2009
and, in that time, drafting reports on more than 30 Government Bills. His
research has directly influenced law and policy, most markedly in two
recent Acts of Parliament. Tomkins' research on the constitutional
conventions of ministerial responsibility influenced a series of
amendments to the Health and Social Care Act 2012; his research into
national security and the due process of law proved critical, again
resulting in several amendments, to the Justice and Security Act 2013.
Underpinning research
Professor Adam Tomkins holds the John Millar Chair of Public Law at the
University of Glasgow (2003-present). The research which underpins the
impact of his work centres on two main areas — the constitutional
conventions of ministerial responsibility and national security law — both
themes throughout Tomkins' academic career and key to several of his
publications.
(a) The conventions of ministerial responsibility
The convention of ministerial responsibility establishes the
accountability of government to Parliament. While at the University of
Glasgow, Tomkins has undertaken doctrinal scholarship on both the UK
constitution and EU public law in relation to such conventions. Among the
research questions explored by Tomkins' work in this area are the
following: how accountability and responsibility relate to one another;
how resignation and responsibility relate to one another; how ministerial
responsibility and the responsibility of others (e.g. civil servants)
relate to one another.
Tomkins' methodology in exploring these issues combines detailed
examination of case-studies, enabling him to distinguish constitutional
from unconstitutional conduct in a context that is often politically
fraught and lacking in clarity.
Key arguments advanced by Tomkins in the course of this work include the
following: that constitutional responsibility is a discrete concept, which
should be distinguished from what a minister is personally responsible
for; that the constitutional responsibility of ministers is owed
specifically to Parliament (although in other senses ministers may at the
same time owe obligations of responsibility to the Prime Minister, to
party, or even to the media); and that no constitutional distinction is to
be drawn between responsibility, accountability and answerability.
(b) National security law
Tomkins' scholarship which led to his recent outputs of 2010 [4] and 2011
[5] has given him extensive knowledge of due process in national security
litigation. National security requires the state to keep secrets; yet for
litigation to be fair it needs to be conducted as openly as possible. How
to trade off the competing public interests of national security secrets,
on the one hand, and open and natural justice, on the other, has proved to
be one of the most contested subjects in British public law in recent
years.
In his article National Security and the Role of the Court, Tomkins
sought to shift the focus from the treatment of national security and
counter-terrorism in the case law of the House of Lords towards an
examination of the approach taken in the lower administrative courts and
tribunals, whose task it is to consider such questions at first instance.
Through his analysis of decisions taken by these courts in the contexts
of control orders, proscribed organisations, and deprivation of
citizenship, Tomkins demonstrated that judicial scrutiny of government
actions and decisions taken in the interests of national security appears
never to have been more intense. Moreover, Tomkins' examination of the
work of the lower courts in this area has revealed that the approach they
adopt when considering whether something is in the interests of national
security differs considerably from that of the House of Lords. Whereas the
House of Lords argued that such questions are not questions of law but
instead of judgement and policy and should therefore be left to the
discretion of the Secretary of State, the lower courts have interpreted
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights relating to the
right to a fair trial to mean that because questions of national security
have to come before the courts to ensure that such rights are not
violated, the claims made in the name of national security must be subject
to scrutiny by the courts.
Additionally, Tomkins has considered the issue of the use of closed
material in cases that deal with issues of national security and
counter-terrorism. Closed material is evidence that, for reasons of
national security, cannot be disclosed to individuals who are subject to
national security controls. Under such circumstances, a special advocate
with security clearance is appointed who is able to see the closed
evidence and make submissions to the court on behalf of the individual.
Once the special advocate has seen the close material, however, s/he is
not generally permitted to communicate further with the individual.
Suggesting that the use of special advocates and closed material
represents one of the key struggles in accommodating security concerns
with due process in law, Tomkins has argued strongly for reform to current
rules governing such matters. He has proposed that a new rule should be
introduced such that: it can never be in accordance with the due process
of law for material evidence to remain closed in any form of legal
proceedings-even where a special advocate is appointed- unless both the
Government and the court have been required to balance the interest in
disclosure against the interest in non-disclosure.
Tomkins' scholarship in this area has contributed important commentary to
debates about the requirement for courts to be able scrutinise decisions
made by the executive to impose severe restrictions on people's rights and
civil liberties.
References to the research
Tomkins, A. 2003. Public Law. Oxford University Press (especially
chapter 5 on ministerial responsibility) [RAE 2008 — Available from HEI]
Tomkins, A. 2008. Political Accountability in the United Kingdom (in L
Verhay, H Brooksteeg and I Van Den Driessche (eds), Political
Accountability in Europe: Which Way Forward?, Europa Law
Publishing), pp. 243-69 [Available from HEI]
Tomkins, A. 2010. National Security and the Role of the Court, Law
Quarterly Review, 126, pp. 543-67.ISSN 0023-933X [Available from
HEI] (Output published in high quality journal operating rigorous
peer-review).
Tomkins, A. 2011. National Security and the Due Process of Law, Current
Legal Problems, 64 pp. 215-53) (doi:10.1093/clp/cur001).(Output
subject to comprehensive peer-review process by Journal prior to
publication). [REF2]
Turpin C and Tomkins A. 2011. British Government and the Constitution,
7th edition. Cambridge University Press (especially Chapters 3
and 9 on ministerial responsibility). [Available from HEI]
Details of the impact
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (HLCC) is a
cross-party committee that examines all Bills before Parliament for their
constitutional compatibility, reporting to Parliament on the
constitutional impact of legislation.
In 2009, Tomkins was appointed as one of two legal advisers to the HLCC,
and has since drafted reports on over 30 Bills. On numerous occasions,
these reports have identified matters that have led to significant
legislative amendment by the House of Lords. Leading examples include the
Health and Social Care Bill (2011-12) and the Justice and Security Bill
(2012-13).
The Health and Social Care Bill (2011-12)
The Health and Social Care Bill sought to amend core aspects of the NHS
Act 2006, which governed the National Health Service in England. By virtue
of the 2006 Act, the Secretary of State is legally and politically
responsible to Parliament for the NHS in England. Tomkins highlighted
certain provisions in the Bill which would pose a risk to the Secretary of
State's continuing constitutional responsibility for the NHS. Two of these
provisions were; the definition of the Secretary of State's
responsibilities (Clause 1) and the introduction of Clinical Commissioning
Groups which would take over some service provision responsibilities
(Clause 1C). Tomkins advised HLCC that these provisions would risk
diluting the Government's constitutional responsibilities with regard to
the National Health Service. Following Tomkins' advice, the HLCC reported
(September 2011) that if the Health and Social Care Bill were enacted as
it stood, the chain of constitutional responsibility within the NHS would
be severed.
In November — December 2011, Tomkins and his fellow legal adviser
represented the HLCC at a series of meetings with Department of Health
officials and First Parliamentary Counsel, at which they discussed the
significant consequences of the Bill. Tomkins prepared a follow-up report,
which HLCC published in December 2011 [2; 3]. The report proposed
amendments to the Bill which were crucial to ensuring that the Secretary
of State's constitutional responsibilities for the NHS were positioned
beyond legal doubt. The House of Lords endorsed these amendments and the
amendments to Sections 1 and 1C of the Bill were adopted in the Act.
The follow-up report contains an Appendix (written by Tomkins) which sets
out in authoritative form the HLCC's understanding of the constitutional
conventions of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. This
understanding formed the basis of HLCC's subsequent work on the
Accountability of Civil Servants, an inquiry undertaken by HLCC in respect
of which Tomkins and Rawlings was a specialist adviser. Many of the
recommendations contained in the HLCC's final report from this inquiry
were supported by the Government in its response to the report.
The Justice and Security Bill (2012-13)
In Al Rawi v Security Service ([2011] UKSC 34) the UK Supreme
Court ruled that the courts had no inherent power to order that a civil
action may be heard under `closed material procedure' (CMP). CMP, invented
by statute in 1997, is used in some counter-terrorism contexts: it allows
sensitive material to be used as evidence in litigation without it being
served on the parties. Instead, it is served on a security-cleared
`special advocate'. The procedure is highly controversial.
In May 2012, the Government introduced its Justice and Security Bill into
Parliament. The Bill as introduced incorporated a number of
recommendations which Tomkins (together with Tom Hickman from University
College London) had made in an earlier response, on behalf of the Bingham
Centre for the Rule of Law, to a Green Paper published by the Government
in 2011. This response had argued that proposals such as advocating for
`closed material procedure' (CMP) to be available generally in civil
litigation were excessive. The Justice and Security Bill (as introduced)
proposed that CMP be available in civil trials only in the interests of
national security, a crucial recommendation made by Tomkins. However,
despite being an improvement on the 2011 Green Paper, the Bill remained
problematic.
When it was introduced into the House of Lords, Tomkins examined the Bill
and advised the HLCC. On the basis of his advice, HLCC published a report
(June 2012) which urged several amendments, including that; (a) any party
to a case (not only the Secretary of State) should be permitted to apply
for a trial to adopt a CMP; (b) the Bill needed to clarify the intended
relationship between CMP and the common law principles of Public Interest
Immunity; (c) Ministers should not be able to extend the availability of
CMP to other proceedings, such as inquests; (d) the Government should be
required to report annually to Parliament on the use of CMP; and (e) the
Bill should be independently reviewed five years after it comes into force
[7]. All of these recommendations were accepted by Parliament and now
appear in the Justice and Security Act 2013.
In both his work for the Bingham Centre and his advice on the Justice and
Security Bill for HLCC Tomkins drew extensively on research first
presented in his articles in the Law Quarterly Review and Current
Legal Problems on the Role of the Court, and Due Process in Law, as
they relate to questions of National Security (see (3) and (4) at Section
3, above).
Sources to corroborate the impact
[1] House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Report on
Health and Social Care Bill, published 30 September 2011 (link)
[2] House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Report on
Health and Social Care Bill: Follow-up, published 20 December 2011 (link)
[3] Published Letter from Baroness Jay of Paddington to Earl Howe,
Parliamentary Under- Secretary of State re: Tomkins and Rawlings meeting
with Department of Health Officials, sent 9 November 2011 (link)
[4] See Health and Social Care Act 2012 (link)
[5] Tomkins, A. and Hickman, T. 2011. `Response To The Justice
And Security Green Paper', Bingham Centre For The Rule Of Law (link)
[6] See, in particular, Section 6 of Justice and Security Act 2013
(link)
[7] House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Report on
Justice and Security Bill,
published 15 June 2012 (link)
[8] QC responsible for independently reviewing counter-terrorist
legislation can attest to the influence of the research in the
preparations of the Justice and Security Bill.