Organisational Autonomy in the National Health Service
Submitting Institution
Royal Holloway, University of LondonUnit of Assessment
Business and Management StudiesSummary Impact Type
PoliticalResearch Subject Area(s)
Medical and Health Sciences: Public Health and Health Services
Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services: Business and Management
Studies In Human Society: Policy and Administration
Summary of the impact
Research on the effects of organizational autonomy in the NHS was
conducted at Royal Holloway between 2006 and 2009, and has informed
debates that have contributed to policy and practitioner decision-making.
Through qualitative methods, it examined the impact of autonomy (from
central government) upon local decision-making in NHS organisations. The
work explained why the number of Foundation Trusts (FTs) established had
not risen in line with the Department of Health's expectations, which
originally sought to make all NHS Trusts become FTs. It also explained why
FTs were not willing to exercise their autonomy despite being able to do
so. The research has influenced policy debate and decision-making within
the Department of Health, Monitor (the FT regulator), and the wider NHS.
Underpinning research
This case-study of organizational autonomy in the English NHS is based on
research conducted at Royal Holloway between 2006 and 2009, and funded by
the National Institute of Health Research. It was led by Professor Mark
Exworthy (at Royal Holloway since 2004). There were 5 co-applicants
(Peckham, LSHTM; Powell, Birmingham; Greener, Durham; Anand and Holloway,
Open University) and two funded researchers, one of which was based at
Royal Holloway. The study used qualitative methods of interview,
observation and documentary analysis in two contrasting case-studies over
a 20-month period. Each case-study involved a network of NHS organizations
including the local commissioner of services (Primary Care Trust) and
local NHS provider organisations (including FTs and non-FTs).
In 2004, the English NHS introduced a policy of greater autonomy to high
performing organizations which decentralized power to FTs. It was stated
government policy that all Trusts would become FTs by December 2008, but
by January 2009 only 113 (just over 50%) had done so. Despite granting
autonomy to individual organisations, this policy neglected the ways in
which organisations were increasingly working together in local networks
(regarding service delivery or knowledge sharing, for example). The
tensions between vertical decentralisation (i.e., from the centre) and
horizontal decentralisation (comprising organisational networks called
"local health economies") were examined by the study (publication 4).
The research illustrated the limits to NHS markets and the performance
paradigm (publications 1, 2). Firstly, FTs fitted into a programme of NHS
reform which included the extension of market-style relationships. The
authorisation of fewer than expected FTs, low managerial capability and
their unwillingness to exercise their new powers pointed towards
explanations in which the role of the market was minimized in favour of
continued locally embedded social and institutional relationships
(publications 3,6).
Secondly, informal perceptions of organisational performance (as opposed
to formal metrics of performance) often indicated high trust and goodwill
between neighbouring organisations (publication 2). In such instances,
research showed how some additional de facto autonomy was
generated. Thus, trust underpinned inter-organisational relationships even
in the absence of formally-granted autonomy. Hence, for some non-FTs,
informal performance allowed them some discretion rather than necessarily
applying for FT status.
Research explained why the number of FTs had not risen in line with
government's expectations, and so establish a regime which sustained
market-based incentives (of patient choice and competition), predicated on
local NHS organisations having decision-making autonomy. The research
revealed the consequences of granting autonomy. Indeed, none of the
government's policy projections about such numbers were met. In 2013, many
NHS organisations still have not become FTs, because of their weak
financial position. Mergers between FTs and non-FTs are taking place so
that the entire NHS can operate on a "level playing" field suitable in a
more market-style environment (with private organizations and
not-for-profit organizations).
References to the research
2. Exworthy, M., Frosini, F. & Jones, L. (2011) 'Are NHS foundation
trusts able and willing to exercise autonomy? `You can take a horse to
water...'' Journal of Health Services Research and Policy, 16, 4,
pp. 232-237.
4. Peckham, S., Exworthy, M., Powell, M. and Greener, I. (2008)
`Decentralizing health services in the UK: a new conceptual framework.' Public
Administration, 86, 2, pp.559-580.
During the period 2008-2013, grant funding of £1,770,991 was awarded
(with Exworthy as PI or co-PI) through competitive peer reviewed
processes, of which:
• Five projects worth £1,578,665 were supported through the NIHR
(Service, Delivery and Organisation programme), and
• Two projects worth £192,326 were supported by the ESRC.
Details of the impact
The impact of the research was apparent in the influence upon policy
debate and decision-making at various levels within the Department of
Health (source 1, 4ii), Monitor (the FT regulator) (source 4iii), and the
wider NHS (source 4). The research was a unique academic contribution to
the public understanding of autonomy of FTs (source 3). Beyond academic
dissemination, it achieved reach and significance in shaping debate and
influencing policy towards further development of FTs.
The Health Select Committee held an inquiry into FTs hearing in 2008,
just after the 100th FT was authorized. It deemed that it was
important to appraise this reform and its contribution to NHS performance,
especially given the "surprising lack of published evidence" (source1i
p.5). Exworthy (the only academic to give evidence) spoke to MPs about
organisational autonomy and the emerging impact of the government's policy
on FTs. The Committee heard that the research had revealed various
dimensions of autonomy (such as the distinction between freedom from
government and freedom to innovate), and had exposed the caution
which many FTs were displaying (despite the apparent entrepreneurialism
and innovation which was supposed to be engendered).
This evidence shaped the Committee's conclusions regarding the extent of
autonomy in the NHS and the impact of FTs' decisions upon neighbouring NHS
organisations. The research was cited 12 times in the Committee's report
(source 1i). Further, three of its recommendations were linked to
Exworthy's evidence:
#20: The Department of Health should, as a priority, commission research
to assess FTs' performance objectively. This will require access to FT
data. Researchers have found it difficult to access such data. This should
be centrally collected by Monitor and published. (source 1i paragraph 113)
#23: Unfortunately, there are persisting concerns about what level of
government intervention in FTs' affairs is legitimate. We recommend that
the Government clarify what the appropriate levels of intervention are.
(source 1i paragraph 116)
#24: FTs' use of their autonomy and the relationship between FTs, their
regulator, and Government should be included in the Department of Health's
evaluation of FTs' progress which we have recommend above. ( source 1i
paragraph 117)
Exworthy's contribution to the Committee's inquiry received comment from
the leading trade journal (source 2).
The Director of Delivery and Development, NHS Trust Development
Authority, and former DH civil servant responsible for the design and
implementation of Foundation Trust policy says of the Exworthy research: "His
research was crucial as it shed light, for the first time, on the ways
in which NHS Foundation Trusts were using (or not) using their new found
autonomy and crucially explained the reasons for this" and "His
research proved very instrumental in the development of the policy up to
and beyond the 2010 general election in terms of shaping the evaluative
criteria for Foundation Trusts, considerations about the speed and
impact of extension of the FT policy to poorly performing Trusts and the
stronger emphasis on the subsequent `private income' cap for Trusts (as
an incentive for further improvement)". (source 4 i)
According to a Managing Director, NHS Leadership Academy (and former CEO,
Sheffield PCT, a participant in the process of impact delivery: "His
results were striking... I am confident that Mark's results will prove
vital to Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in developing their new
roles of the local commissioners of health services." (source 4 ii)
Senior Fellow at King's Fund and Director, Global Healthcare Group at
KPMG and former Director of Policy at the NHS Confederation (NHS
employers' organisation) says of the evidence arising from the research: "This
evidence was important to the decision-making of FTs themselves but also
to Primary Care Trusts (the then local commissioners of services from
FTs), other NHS Trusts, Monitor and the Department of Health. ...this
contributed significantly to the decisions about the speed and impact of
extension of the FT policy to poorly performing Trusts and the stronger
emphasis on the subsequent `private income' cap for Trusts." (source
4 iii)
Sources to corroborate the impact
1. Oral evidence for the House of Commons Health Select Committee (2008):
i. Select Committee Report:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhealth/833/833.pdf
Corroborating citation of Exworthy's research in the Select Committee's
report & recommendations arising from oral evidence received in (1ii).
ii. Minutes of evidence to Health Select Committee Inquiry:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhealth/833/8070301.htm
Corroborating oral evidence given by Exworthy to the Select Committee.
2. West, D. (2009) Foundation Trusts challenged to use freedoms, the
Health Service Journal
http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/policy/foundation-trusts-challenged-to-use-freedoms/2007745.article
Corroborating coverage of Exworthy's testimony to the Select Committee in
a leading trade journal.
3. The final research report: Exworthy, M., Frosini, F., Jones, L.,
Peckham, S., Powell, M., Greener, I., Anand, P. & Holloway, J.A.
(2009) Decentralisation and performance: autonomy and incentives in
local health economies. Final report to the NHS NCC-SDO research and
development programme http://www.sdo.nihr.ac.uk/projdetails.php?ref=08-1618-125
(302pp) was accessed 4,629 times as of July 2013. It corroborates
Exworthy's role in the NIHR-funded study into organisational autonomy in
the NHS and was the basis of his evidence to the Select Committee.
4. Testimonials of research impact are available from 3 individuals with
contrasting experience of the NHS.
i. Director of Delivery and Development, NHS Development Authority &
former Department of Health civil servant responsible for the design and
implementation of Foundation Trust policy. The testimonial supplied
addresses the pioneering nature of Exworthy's research and corroborates
its impact upon Foundation Trust policy within the Department of Health
(through the dissemination of NIHR results and his evidence to the Health
Select Committee) but also Monitor, the NHS Confederation and individual
NHS Trusts up to and beyond the 2010 general election.
ii. Managing Director, NHS Leadership Academy (and former CEO, Sheffield
PCT). The testimonial supplied corroborates the fresh perspective brought
by Exworthy's research on the challenges in securing change in PCT
management practices.
iii. A Senior Fellow at King's Fund and Director, Global Healthcare Group
at KPMG and former Director of Policy at the NHS Confederation (NHS
employers' organisation) ). The testimonial supplied corroborates
Exworthy's contribution to the understanding of FT/NHS Trust relationships
and the subsequent impact on Monitor and Dept of Health.