Improving the legal and corporate understanding of informal practices in Russia
Submitting Institution
University College LondonUnit of Assessment
Area StudiesSummary Impact Type
LegalResearch Subject Area(s)
Studies In Human Society: Political Science
Law and Legal Studies: Law
Summary of the impact
Research conducted at UCL by Professor Alena Ledeneva on informal
practices and governance networks in Russia led to the development of
tools used by senior executives at international corporations working in
Russia and elsewhere to evaluate and manage the risk of corruption in
their organisations. The research also influenced the rulings and expert
testimony provided in British courts affecting the outcomes of major
commercial trials such as Cherney -v- Deripaska (2008) and Berezovsky -v-
Abramovich (2011) as well as in extradition cases at the Westminster
District Court in London.
Underpinning research
Professor Alena Ledeneva's research on corruption and informality has
built her an international reputation in a field she has effectively
defined. Professor Ledeneva began at UCL as a Lecturer in 1999, and was
promoted to a Chair in 2008.
Ledeneva's research at UCL builds on her earlier work on Russia's economy
of favours which helped to solve a double puzzle in the history of
authoritarian regimes: in Soviet times, reliance on informal networks
allowed people to survive in an economy of shortage, just as it allowed
the Soviet regime to endure despite the systemic inefficiency of its
institutions. While formally supporting the regime, people engaged in
multiple informal practices in order to mitigate its pressure. Blat
— the use of personal networks for getting things done - provides just one
example of the many informal practices that both made the regime more
tolerable and, at the same time, helped to undermine it, thus serving both
continuity and change. Her 2000 publication [a] developed Ledeneva's
analysis of the ambivalent nature of informal practices that both
subverted and supported institutions in both the Soviet and post-Soviet
eras.
Subsequent research has examined the informal practices that replaced blat
during Russia's dramatic break-up with its communist past [b].
`Democratic' and `market' institutions, including competitive elections,
free media, independent judiciary and secure property rights, to be
established during the 1990s, became enveloped in informal practices that
both facilitated their development and undermined it. Kompromat, black
piar, krugovaya poruka, barter and double accounting were the most
widespread in that period [b]. Arguing that such practices constitute
important indicators in assessing the outcomes of reform, Ledeneva turned
to analysis of the network-based system of informal governance — Putin's sistema
— characterised by informal incentives, control and capital flows operated
by power networks [c]. What it lacks in democratic graces the sistema
appears to compensate, according to Ledeneva, with the effectiveness of
its networks and relationships and their impressive capacity to mobilise
[c].
Aiming to disaggregate predominant notions of corruption, Ledeneva argues
that informal practices not only can be measured, but constitute
indicators that can be instrumental in policy-making. Although informal
practices do not readily lend themselves to quantitative analysis,
Professor Ledeneva devised a survey measuring the public perception of
informal pressure on the judiciary from the executive (so-called
`telephone justice') [d]. A representative sample of 1,600 respondents was
used in 2007, funded by the British Academy, followed by a repeated survey
in 2010, commissioned by the EU-Russia Centre, which found that
perceptions of extra-legal pressure on the judiciary remained widespread,
despite multiple legal reforms undertaken by president Medvedev.
Ledeneva's research identified the global implications of the weak rule of
law in Russia, associated with `telephone justice' driving litigants away
from Russian courts and towards British courts, resulting in Russia's loss
of sovereignty as major decisions on Russian assets are decided in High
Courts in London [c, d].
In a 2009 paper, Ledeneva argued that the post-communist experience
doesn't fit the global corruption paradigm [e]. To reveal the implications
of post-communist corruption in the corporate sector, Ledeneva
collaborated with Stanislav Shekshnia (Affiliate Professor of
Entrepreneurship at INSEAD) to survey informal practices and mitigating
strategies by 111 CEOs operating in Russia, the outcome of the pilot
survey has been published in 2011 [f]. Devising alternative measurements
of corruption has since become the core of the FP7 project
"Anti-Corruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses
to the Challenge of Corruption" (2012-2017), a large-scale research
project funded by the European Commission, where Ledeneva plays a leading
role.
References to the research
[a] Alena V. Ledeneva, `Continuity and change of blat practices in Soviet
and post-Soviet Russia'. In Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating
Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s. Ed S. Lovell, A. V.
Ledeneva, A. Rogachevskii (Macmillan Studies in Russia and East Europe,
2000). Available on request.
[b] Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works (Cornell
University Press, 2006) [rigorous peer review process prior to
publication; over 250 citations, widely and positively reviewed in
authoritative sources e.g. American Journal of Sociology; DOI: 10.1086/522397].
Available on request.
[c] Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise: Sistema, Power Networks
and Informal Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2013) [rigorous
peer review process prior to publication; funded Leverhulme/ Science Po,
Paris Fellowship to complete the monograph; submitted to REF2]
[d] Alena V. Ledeneva, `Telephone justice in Russia', Post-Soviet
Affairs, 24, 4 (2008) [2008 publication in rigorously peer-reviewed
journal; submitted to REF2]
Survey follow-up: Ledeneva A. (2010) `Telephone Justice in Russia: An
Update' Brussels: EU-Russia Centre Newsletter, No. XVIII. http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVIII_ENG.pdf.
[e] Alena V. Ledeneva, `Corruption in Postcommunist Societies in Europe:
A re-examination', Perspectives on European Politics and Society,
10.1 (2009), 69-86 [submitted to REF 2].
Relevant peer-reviewed external funding:
`Can Russia Modernise?' Alena Ledeneva. Leverhulme Fellowship
RF/7/RFG/2010/0023 (P17376). Amount: £9036. Duration: 1-Sept-10 to
31-Dec-10. [c] emerged from this grant.
`Anti-Corruption Policies
Revisited: Global Trends And European Responses to the Challenge of
Corruption (Anticorrp)'. Alena Ledeneva. Amount: £435,450. Duration:
01-Mar-12 to 28-Feb-17.
Details of the impact
The research described above has been used by businesses and provided a
basis for legal rulings and expert testimony in British courts.
Impacts on Legal Understanding and Judicial Rulings
Professor Ledeneva's research has been widely used in legal proceedings,
informing both commercial and extradition cases in London. She has used
insights garnered from her experience of research to transfer specialist
knowledge and provide scholarly advice to legal experts and policy makers
dealing with Russia or Russian matters. Notable examples since 2008
include: [1]
- Discussion for about 50 lawyers and businessmen at the Forum of the
Russo-British Chamber of Commerce, London, on the legal environment for
investment in Russia, 23-34 June 2010.
- Talk at Pushkin House for over 100 attendees on the ramifications of
high-profile Russian legal battles in London courts, sponsored by
Littleton Chambers (on `Russian Legal Battles in London' on 6 June 2013.
Through these talks and similar activities, Ledeneva's research has made
a valuable contribution to major commercial and extradition cases at the
High Court. An example of this is provided by one major extradition lawyer
who has represented Russian individuals living in England but charged with
criminal offences in Russia, leading to extradition requests. In nearly
all of the cases for about 10 individuals he has been involved in, he was
required to provide expert advice on issues surrounding the judicial
system and related factors [2]. For these he considered Ledeneva's
research `absolutely essential' [2], and specifically cited [a], [b] and
[c] in section 3 above.
Specific examples of the contribution of Ledeneva's research to recent
legal cases include its use by an expert witness to argue, during a case
brought in February 2010 for the extradition of the oligarch Yevgeny
Chichvarkin, founder of Russia's biggest mobile phone company, Evroset,
who fled Russia when police alleged that he had kidnapped a truck driver
whom he believed had stolen a $1m consignment of mobile phones. Ledeneva's
research on telephone justice was used to argue (inter alia) that the
accused could not receive a fair trial in Russia unless special measures
were taken. The request for extradition was eventually dropped [3].
Another example was that of the expert witness report on the Russian
political and legal regime in the $5bn Berezovsky -v- Abramovich case
before Justice Gloster in 2012 [4].
The research has also been quoted directly by judges in rulings on high
profile commercial cases, including the £2 billion suit by Michael Cherney
against his fellow oligarch, Oleg Deripaska, in which Cherney claimed that
he was owed a share of Rusal, the world's largest aluminium producer.
First brought in 2006, the case was notably predicated on a request that
the claim be served in London, rather than Russia. In his widely cited
ruling on Cherney -v- Deripaska (2008), High Court Judge Mr Justice
Christopher Clarke directly cited Ledeneva's research [c, e] in support of
his ruling that Cherney did indeed have the right to sue Deripaska in an
English court due to `the risks inherent in a trial in Russia'. In making
this judgment, he referred particularly to `persistent rumours of
"telephone justice", where the state or a senior judge gives the judge
instructions to decide the case as was the norm in the Soviet era' [5].
This decision was unanimously upheld in the Court of Appeal in 2009 [6].
In an analysis of this much-discussed decision, a lawyer at the commercial
law firm Herbert Smith LLP pointed out that: `Clarke was further persuaded
by expert evidence that in Russia, in cases where the government itself is
a party and which concern a direct material strategic interest of the
Russian state, the courts may depart from their generally fair and
impartial performance in a commercial dispute between private persons'
[7].
Impacts on Corporate Training and Consultancy
In 2012, Transparency International ranked Russia 133rd out of 174
countries on its corruption perception index, and according to some
estimates, corruption accounts for 20-30% of the cost of doing business in
Russia. However, the real picture on the ground is extremely complex, and
businesses employ a wide range of internal and external strategies to
navigate and tackle corruption. As a result, Ledeneva's expertise on
informal practices was frequently solicited by business intelligence
consultancies and think tanks in the UK, US and Europe; during the impact
period, she received several requests for talks which led to her work
being utilised for business intelligence services to a wide range of
corporate clients, but particularly large banking institutions, by Alaco
and GPW [8].
Ledeneva has also drawn on her research ([b] above) in work conducted
between 2010 and 2013 with Professor Stanislav Shekshnia of INSEAD, one of
the world's leading graduate business schools, with campuses in France,
Singapore and Abu Dhabi. Here, her work was used to devise surveys on
informal practices to help CEOs and other executives to reflect on the
variety of informal practices in their own organisations, to monitor and
assess the subsequent risk of corruption there, and to devise strategies
to manage them in this unique context [f]. Informal practices identified
in Ledeneva's work constitute 27 entries in the questionnaire, thus
enabling executives to reflect on the variety of informal practices in
their organisations. Ledeneva's expertise on informal practices and
corruption therefore allowed the development of this innovative corporate
tool for the identification, measurement and mitigation of corruption
risks.
These surveys were disseminated to 140 senior managers through three
training sessions (2010-12) on managing corruption in the INSEAD
executive education programme at Fontainebleau and Singapore. They were
subsequently used for almost 1,000 managers in the Sberbank-5000 INSEAD
executive development programme [10]. In 2009-12 she also conducted
executive workshops for approximately 40 executives from DTEK (Ukraine),
NIS (Serbia) and Gazpromneft (Russia) [10]. The academic programme
director, and Ledeneva's collaborator, cited the positive rating her
sessions received (3.9 out of 5), and noted that several attendees had
utilised the materials independently; one launched an internal corruption
mitigation programme, while another applied the methodology to their North
African operations [10]. Russia's third-largest oil company, TNK-BP, for
example, incorporated the surveys into training materials for executives
in Singapore (September and October 2011) and for alumni conferences in
Moscow (December 2011), whilst PricewaterhouseCoopers sponsored a lecture
on Russian cases in London courts at the Great Britain Russia Society,
London (2 December 2009) and a PwC in-house talk on 18 March 2010 [9].
These tools thus provided a new approach to understanding and tackling
corruption in the Russian context, and of developing ways to address it by
drawing on tools developed on the basis of Ledeneva's research [10].
Sources to corroborate the impact
[1] For the transfer of specialist knowledge to legal experts
(Russo-British Chamber of Commerce programme; Pushkin House): http://www.pushkinhouse.org/single-event/events/russian-law-panel.
[2] Statement provided by a Partner at Corker Binning on his use of
Ledeneva's work in cases in which he has helped Russians living in England
to fight extradition demands. Available on request.
[3] Statement provided by expert witness drawing on research during
Chichvarkin case, Professor of Political Science, Law and Criminology,
University of Toronto. Available on request.
[4] Berezovsky -v- Abramovich, Commercial Court (Chancery Division) summary, 31 August 2012,
Executive Summary of the Full Judgment of Gloster J in Berezovsky-v-Abramovich, Action 2007 Folio 942.
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/judgments/2012/berezovsky-abramovich-summary-31082012
Use of Ledeneva's research corroborated by expert witness: Professor of
Law, Birkbeck College, available on request.
[5] For the use of Ledeneva's research by an expert witness in Cherney
-v- Deripaska [Case No: 2006 FOLIO 1218, Neutral Citation Number: [2008]
EWHC 1530 (Comm), Date: 03/07/2008] see paragraph 225 of http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2008/1530.html.
[6] Appeal in the Court of Appeals [Neutral Citation Number: [2009] EWCA
Civ 849] Available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/849.html.
[7] Discussion of Cherney -v- Deripaska in `Shall we take this outside?'
Article contributed by Herbert Smith LLP to the July 2009 newsletter of
the International Law Office.
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=4d6c5841-38a9-43af-8781-
777ffc3a2913&redir=0.
[8] Claims to the impacts of Ledeneva's work on business intelligence
services provided by Alaco are corroborated by the company's Director of
Operations. Available on request.
[9] PricewaterhouseCoopers agenda, email invite (2010) and notice (2009)
TNK-BP module-3 Programme overview, 19-24 September 2011 and 17-22 October
2011. Available on request.
[10] Factual statement from the Leadership Development Programme
Director, INSEAD. Available on request.