Setting Penalties for Competition Policy
Submitting Institution
University of St AndrewsUnit of Assessment
Economics and EconometricsSummary Impact Type
EconomicResearch Subject Area(s)
Economics: Applied Economics
Summary of the impact
The underpinning research arose from an ESRC-funded project on
the "Optimal Design of Decision and Enforcement Procedures for Competition
Policy" by Professor David Ulph (St Andrews) and Professor Yannis
Katsoulacos (AUEB). This influenced the penalty policies of competition
authorities in two countries: the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK
and the Autorite de la Concurrence (AdC) in France. For OFT it contributed
to the formulation of revised penalty guidelines, specifically a proposed
increase in baseline penalty from 10% to 30%. For AdC it impacted on the
formulation of the first penalty guidelines they published. Thus our
research had impact on the only two major Competition Authorities in the
world who revised penalty policy in last 5 years.
Underpinning research
Economics has a long-standing concern with the harm that can be caused by
the lack of competition in particular markets, and it tries to identify
both theoretically and empirically the conditions under which certain
practices (e.g. mergers, bundling) are anti-competitive. Most advanced
countries and many developing countries have competition authorities that
enforce competition policy by identifying, stopping and penalising what
are regarded as anti-competitive practices. Yet there had been
comparatively little research into the welfare consequences of different
ways of enforcing competition policy: choice of legal standard (Per Se
vs Effects-Based); design of penalty regime; timing of
interventions; nature of appeals procedures etc. Moreover, what research
has been done in this area has typically been framed in the context of
specific practices - e.g. mergers.
In 2006 Prof Katsoulacos, Athens University of Economics and Business
(AUEB), and Prof D. Ulph, University of St Andrews (in post since 2006),
began a systematic programme of research to provide a general
framework (i.e. not tied to specific practice) in which these issues could
be addressed. Their 2009 paper [1] established for the first time
the precise conditions under which, generally, an Effects-Based
legal standard would be better than a Per Se legal standard in
terms of; (i) decision error costs, and (ii) deterrence effects. This led
to successful application for ESRC funding for a 3-year project (starting
Jan 2010) to extend their research in a number of directions. For example,
their 2011 paper [2] showed that multi-stage decision processes —
such as appeals — do not necessarily improve the outcomes of an Effects-Based
legal standard.
As part of their project Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph committed to a
process of knowledge exchange through regular meetings with both OFT and
AdC. This engagement indicated that penalties was an area of active
concern for both OFT and AdC.
Two major issues have arisen in the existing academic literature on the
optimal penalties for anti-competitive behaviour.
(a) Legal Uncertainty. Effects-Based
enforcement procedures are often criticised because they entail legal
uncertainty. This means that, when deciding whether or not to take a
specific action — e.g. merger — then, under an Effects-Based
enforcement procedure, firms may not know (a) what decision a competition
authority will make (should they be investigated) (b) the sort of evidence
the authority will use in reaching its decision; (c) indeed firms may not
even understand in what sense their action could be construed to be
against the public interest (what have I done wrong?). It has been argued
by some scholars that such legal uncertainty should lead to low/zero
penalties. In their 2013 paper [4], Professors Katsoulacos and
Ulph: (i) show for the first time how to formalise the idea of legal
uncertainty and how to distinguish it from errors; (ii) develop its
implications for both the choice of the appropriate level of penalties and
the choice of legal standard. They establish the precise conditions under
which legal uncertainty may lead to a zero penalty, but also show that
penalties could be higher if there were legal uncertainty than if there
were no legal uncertainty.
(b) Level of Penalties It has also been argued that,
across a wide range of competition authorities, existing penalties are too
low to provide effective deterrence. Indeed some scholars have suggested
that penalties should be 50% of revenue, or higher. However the existing
literature on optimal penalties is based on the Economics of Crime and
focuses on criminal activities such as robbery. It therefore ignores a
crucial feature of economic crimes such as anti-competitive behaviour and
their detection/punishment, which is the very long time periods over which
both can take place. This means that firms can either be detected and
penalised while the "crime" is being committed (caught red handed) or else
detected and penalised long after they have ceased to practice
the action. In their 2013 paper [3], Professors Katsoulacos &
Ulph extend the existing literature theoretically and exploit a new data
set to calculate the impact of these factors on penalties. They show that
the optimal penalty should be around 75% of that produced by existing
approaches and that the optimal penalty should therefore be between 27%
and 35%.
References to the research
As indicated, much of the research reported in Section 2 was undertaken
as part of an ESRC-funded project: "Optimal Enforcement and
Decision Structures for Competition Policy" ESRC, RES-062-23-2211,
£137,054.00; 1/01/10 - 31/12/2012. Principal Investigator: D. Ulph Co-
Investigator Y. Katsoulacos
[1] Y. Katsoulacos and D Ulph, "On Optimal Legal Standards for
Competition Policy: A General Welfare-Based Analysis" Journal of
Industrial Economics, 2009, Vol 57, Issue 3, pp 410-437.
DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00393.x
[2] Y. Katsoulacos and D Ulph, "Optimal Enforcement Structures
for Competition Policy: Implications of Judicial Reviews and of Internal
Error Correction Mechanisms" European Competition Journal, 2011,
vol 7, No.1 pp 71-88. DOI: 10.5235/174410511795887624
[3] Y.Katsoulacos and D.Ulph "Antitrust Penalties and the Implications of
Empirical Evidence on Cartel Overcharges" Economic Journal, 2013
DOI: 1111/ecoj12075
Article in refereed Law and Economics Books
[4] Y. Katsoulacos and D Ulph, "Legal Uncertainty and the Limits
to Effects-Based Standards" in Research Handbook in European
Competition Law, Volume II, edited by I. Lianos, and D. Geradin
Edward Elgar, 2013, Chapter 11, pp584-592.
The Economic Journal is a core general journal. Journal of
Industrial Economics is one of the top field journals in Industrial
Economics, while the European Competition Journal is a leading
field journal in the area of Competition Policy with articles by both
academics and practitioners. The ranking of these journal articles is
3*,2*,3* respectively.
Details of the impact
The underpinning research conducted by Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph
influenced changes that both OFT and AdC were making to their penalty
policies. For OFT it contributed to the formulation of revisions to their
published penalty guidelines, and specifically a proposed increase in
baseline penalty from 10% to 30% of revenue. For AdC it helped shape the
formulation of the penalty guidelines that they published for the first
time.
Since other major competition authorities-e.g. the European Commission's
Competition Authority, (DGComp) — currently use a low 10% penalty, the
arguments and research could convince other authorities to raise their
penalties. Any major change in policy by organisations such as OFT and AdC
will be subject to vigorous debate and a vast range of often conflicting
advice. Some of this will arise through internal organisational
discussions as the policy is being developed. But it can also arise after
the policy has been announced and so is subject to external scrutiny and
comment. Research can therefore impact on the final policy that is adopted
both by shaping the initial policy formulation that is announced (and
finally agreed) and also by convincing the organisation that there are
robust defences against the arguments that oppose the initial policy that
is proposed.
However since the underpinning research by Professors Katsoulacos and
Ulph was undertaken at the same time as the policy changes were being
considered/proposed, and was published only after the policy was
announced/implemented — the impact arose as a result of knowledge exchange
activities with both OFT and AdC that was undertaken by Professors
Katsoulacos and Ulph in the course of the research. Consequently the
supporting documents refer to these engagement activities rather than the
subsequent publications.
The underpinning research conducted by Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph
shaped OFT's decisions in two ways, and through both these channels
identified above.
The first research impact arose through the demonstration that Legal
Uncertainty could not be used as a general argument for keeping penalties
low. At a meeting in Dec 2010 with OFT's Head of Economics, Professors
Katsoulacos and Ulph presented some early findings from their research on
legal uncertainty and penalties. The Head of Economics was intrigued by
their result that, while legal uncertainty may sometimes be an
argument for zero penalties, there were other circumstances under which it
might lead to higher penalties [4]. This ran counter to the
prevailing view amongst many legal scholars that legal uncertainty would always
be an argument for low penalties — a view that had support amongst those
in OFT arguing against the proposal to raise penalties. The Head of
Economics at OFT thought this work should be presented at greater length
to a wider OFT audience that included other policy analysts involved in
the review of penalty policy. This presentation took place in January
2011.
In October 2011 OFT published a consultation document on its draft
revised penalty guidance. Consistent with the research findings of
Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph, OFT announced its intention to raise
penalties. However, in para 4.7 of the consultation document, it argues
that "genuine uncertainty on the part of the undertaking as to whether
the agreement or conduct constituted an infringement" could be a
mitigating factor in favour of a lower penalty. This describes precisely
the type of uncertainty under which the research by Professors Katsoulacos
and Ulph suggests that a zero penalty MAY be warranted — though their
research indicates that further conditions need to be met to warrant a
zero penalty. And indeed OFT does not propose to automatically reduce
penalties under this type of uncertainty — it just indicates that it might
do so. So the policy formulation is precisely that proposed in the
research by Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph. Evidence that the proposed
policy was shaped by the research findings on the issue of Legal
Uncertainty comes in a letter from OFT's Chief Economist who states that
the January 2011 presentation "was helpful in clarifying our thinking
about the role of legal uncertainty and ultimately helped confirm our
decision to propose higher starting point penalties." [S1]
The second area of impact came by confirming OFT's decision to propose a
figure of 30% as the appropriate penalty. The impact came through the
evidence submitted by Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph in January 2012, in
response to OFT's consultation. In the consultation document OFT provided
no indication as to why 30% was the appropriate figure. In their evidence
Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph reported on calculations they had
undertaken of what implications flowed from their analysis of optimal
penalties — work that was subsequently published in an academic paper[3].
The analysis and calculations by Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph showed
that while optimal penalties could be higher than the 30% figure proposed
by OFT, their proposed figure lay within a reasonable range of values.
Evidence that our advice had an impact through confirming OFT's view that
30% was a defensible figure comes from the letter from OFT's Chief
Economist which states "We found this helpful in terms of contributing
to a balanced range of views on our proposals because many of the
submissions were arguing against our proposals to raise the penalty
starting point, whereas in their submission Professors Katsoulacos and
Ulph put forward arguments and calculations that suggested that the
optimal baseline penalty might if anything be somewhat higher than the
30% proposed in our consultation document, in particular for
infringements that suffer from low detection rates." [S1]
In France, the AdC has never published guidance on how penalties would be
determined. Research by Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph had an impact on
the internal debates taking place within AdC by demonstrating the value of
reducing certain types of legal uncertainty through publishing guidelines
[4], and by setting out the factors that should be used to determine the
optimal penalties [3]. Although the guidelines are heavily constrained by
the French legal code, nevertheless evidence that our research had such an
impact on AdC's penalty guidelines comes in a letter from AdC's Chief
Economist which states "Discussion on the topic of fine setting was
extremely interesting and timely as the Autorité was in the middle of a
process to write its own sentencing guidelines (this was ultimately done
in May 2011). Although our guidelines on the setting of fines for
anticompetitive behaviour were primarily driven by the legal
requirements of the French Code of Commerce and our past case law, all
the discussions that we have had with - among other — academic
economists (and therefore with Professors Katsoulacos and Ulph) have
greatly influenced our discussions internally and helped thus drafting
our guidelines." [S2]
Sources to corroborate the impact
[S1] A letter from the Chief Economist of OFT The statement which
testifies to:
(i) our active engagement with the Office of Fair Trading on our research
as it developed, and so an understanding of our findings prior to
publication;
(ii) the impact our research has had on their thinking and decisions in
relation to raise the baseline penalty to 30%.
[S2] A similar letter the Chief Economist at AdC which testifies to:
(i) our active engagement with the Autorite de la Concurrence on our
research as it developed, and so an understanding of our findings before
they were published;
(ii) the impact our research has had on their thinking and decisions in
relation to the publication of penalty guidelines.