‘Risk-Based’ Regulatory Reform
Submitting Institution
King's College LondonUnit of Assessment
Geography, Environmental Studies and ArchaeologySummary Impact Type
PoliticalResearch Subject Area(s)
Studies In Human Society: Policy and Administration
Law and Legal Studies: Law
Summary of the impact
Over the last decade, research by the Department of Geography's King's
Centre for Risk
Management (KCRM) has helped successive UK governments to reform
regulation by making
regulatory inspection and enforcement more `risk-based'. Risk-based
approaches promise to make
regulation more efficient by targeting regulatory activities only at cases
that pose unacceptable risks
rather than by trying to prevent all possible harms. KCRM research has
helped make UK regulation
more risk-based in three important ways. First, KCRM research
significantly informed the key
recommendation of HM Treasury's Hampton Review of Administrative
Burdens on Business that
all regulatory inspection and enforcement should be risk-based. Second,
KCRM supported the
implementation of that recommendation when it gained statutory force for
almost all regulators in
2008 through practical advice to a number of government departments and
agencies. Third,
KCRM's impact on regulatory reform was reinforced by HM Government's full
acceptance and
ongoing implementation of Löfstedt's recommendations to strengthen
risk-based regulatory
practice in his 2011 Independent Review of Health and Safety
Regulation.
Underpinning research
Supported by a series of ESRC and government department grants, research
at KCRM by
Fairman (KCL:1993-2007), Howard (KCL:1999-present), Löfstedt
(KCL:2002-present), Rothstein
(KCL:2006-present) and Yapp (KCL:2002-2008) has made significant
contributions to
understanding the emergence, meaning, practice and effectiveness of
`risk-based' techniques of
regulation. The central idea of risk-based regulation is that it is
neither possible, nor desirable, to
try to eliminate all adverse regulatory outcomes. To try to do so would be
disproportionately costly
to achieve and could distract attention from more serious problems.
Instead, proponents of risk-
based regulation insist that regulators should aim for an optimal level of
risk by focusing control
efforts only on those adverse regulatory outcomes deemed unacceptable
based on assessments
of their probability as well as impact. As such,
risk-based approaches hold out the promise of a
more consistent, rational and efficient basis for regulatory practice.
Building on previous ESRC-funded research on the institutional factors
shaping risk
regulation regimes (1997-2000) (3iii), Rothstein's research at KCRM
showed how the emergence
of risk-based regulation is a response to particular institutional
contexts of accountability and
transparency (3vi). That novel theoretical insight was tested
through Defra funded research (3xviii),
which identified critical factors shaping the adoption, practice and
problems of risk-based policy
tools in a wide range of policy contexts (3vii).
In parallel, a series of government funded micro-case study research
projects by Fairman,
Howard and Yapp examined the impact of enforcement interventions on small
and medium sized
enterprises across a range of regulatory domains, such as food and
occupational health and safety
(3ix-3xvii). In particular, the research provided evidence of the
need for enforcement strategies to
be more `risk-based' in ways that took account of the organisational size,
structure and culture of
businesses as well as their attitudes towards non-compliance (3ii;
3viii; 3xi; 3xv; 3xvi).
Löfstedt has also studied `risk-based' regulation in both a national and
an international
context (3i; 3iv; 3v). For example, his research comparing EU
decision-making on food and
chemical safety regulation identified a series of political challenges in
moving away from simple
bans on hazardous substances towards more risk-based regulatory approaches
(3v). Most notably,
Löfstedt's research for his eight-month long 2011 Independent Review
of Health and Safety
Regulation (5xii), which was commissioned by a government
that was deeply sceptical of health
and safety regulation (5ii), provided detailed evidence both of the
value of risk-based approaches
in that policy domain and of the wide support they enjoy with both
industry and the trade unions.
Nevertheless, Löfstedt also identified five key problems that were
impeding the effective operation
of efficient risk-based regulatory controls (see Section 4).
References to the research
Where a doi / url is not supplied, a hard copy is available if
requested.
Key peer reviewed outputs and publications
3i Bouder F., Slavin, D., and Löfstedt, R. 2007. The
Tolerability of Risk: A new framework for Risk
Management. London: Earthscan
3ii Fairman, R. and Yapp, C. 2005. `Enforced Self-Regulation,
Prescription, and Conceptions of
Compliance within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement'. Law
& Policy 27(4): 491-
519. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2005.00209.x
3iii Hood, C., Rothstein, H. and Baldwin, R. 2001. The
Government of Risk: Understanding risk
regulation regimes, Oxford: OUP. Second edition 2004. Also available
online:
www.oxfordscholarship.com
3iv Löfstedt, R. 2005. Risk Management in Post-Trust Societies.
London: Earthscan
3v Löfstedt, R. 2011. `Risk versus hazard: How to regulate in the
21st century'. European Journal
of Risk Regulation, 2: 149-168
3vi Rothstein, H., Huber, M., and Gaskell, G. 2006. `A Theory of
Risk Colonisation: The spiralling
regulatory logics of societal and institutional risk'. Economy and
Society, 35(1): 91-112. doi:
10.1080/03085140500465865
3vii Rothstein, H. and Downer, J. 2012. `Renewing Defra: Exploring
the Emergence of Risk-Based
Policymaking in UK Central Government'. Public Administration. 90
(3): 781-799. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01999.x
3viii Yapp, C. and Fairman, R. 2006. `Factors affecting food
safety compliance within SMEs:
Implications for regulatory and enforcement strategies', Food Control,
17(1):42-51. doi:
10.1016/j.foodcont.2004.08.007
Supporting Grants
3ix Fairman, R. 2001. The use of licensing as a risk
management tool (£3500). Chartered Institute
of Environmental Health
3x Fairman, R. and Howard, M. 2001-03. Effective enforcement
of food safety legislation in small
and medium sized enterprises (£92,909) UK Food Standards Agency
3xi Fairman, R. 2004. An evaluation of the effectiveness of
interventions to achieve compliance
with health and safety law in SMEs (£60,000). UK Health and Safety
Executive. (Published as:
Fairman, R. and Yapp, C. 2005. Making an impact on SME compliance
behaviour: An
evaluation of the effect of interventions upon compliance with health
and safety legislation in
small and medium sized enterprises. HSE Research Report 336
www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr366.pdf
[Accessed June 2013])
3xii Fairman, R. 2005. Developing a harmonised enforcement
risk assessment model (£10,000).
UK Department of Trade and Industry
3xiii Fairman, R. 2005. Building an evidence base for a Food
Safety Intervention Strategy
(£10,000). UK Food Standards Agency
3xiv Fairman, R. 2006. The use of compliance assessment and
regulatory indicators in different
regulatory regimes (£35,000). UK Environment Agency
3xv Howard, M. 2003-04. Concordance in health and safety
enforcement in the hospitality industry
(£50,228). UK Health and Safety Executive. (Published as: Howard, M. and
Galbraith, A. 2004.
Occupational health and safety enforcement strategies to promote
concordance in the
hospitality industry. HSE Research Report 259 www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr259.pdf
[Accessed June 2013])
3xvi Howard, M. 2004. Factors influencing local authority
health and safety intervention and
enforcement activity (£36,413). UK Health and Safety Executive.
(Published as: Howard, M.
and Galbraith, A. 2004. Factors influencing Local Authority health and
safety interventions and
enforcement activity. HSE Research Report. www.hse.gov.uk/research/misc/lainterventions.pdf
[Accessed June 2013])
3xvii Howard, M. and Day, C. 2006-08. A review of the IFD's
(Imported Food Division) initiatives
to improve LA sampling activities and recommendations for future work
(£40,000). Food
Standards Agency
3xviii Rothstein, H. 2007-08. Risk in Policy-making
(£80,000). Defra
Details of the impact
KCRM research has made three important impacts on efforts by successive
UK governments to
reform regulation by making it more risk-based.
First, KCRM research has helped transform the basic principles of
regulatory inspection
and enforcement for the majority of UK regulators during the REF period
through its influence on
the recommendations of HM Treasury's landmark Hampton Review (5x),
which gained statutory
force in 2008 (5v: 5,7). In particular, Hampton extensively cited
research and advice on
enforcement interventions by Fairman, Howard and Yapp (5x:
5;35;36;137;126,140) in support of
his key recommendation that all regulatory inspection and enforcement
should be made risk-based.
Fairman's research for the DTI on the benefits of risk-based enforcement
for retail premises
was also specifically highlighted in HM Government's full acceptance of
the `Hampton Principles'
(5xi:17), and she was subsequently seconded to the Cabinet Office
(2007-8) to lead work on the
implementation and the continuing roll-out of `risk-based' regulatory
practice. The Hampton
Principles gained statutory force in April 2008 through the Regulators'
Compliance Code, which
tasked almost all government departments and regulatory agencies with
ensuring that their
regulatory inspection and enforcement activities were risk-based (5v:12).
For example, the Care
Quality Commission explicitly drew on the Hampton Principles as the basis
for refocusing its
inspection regime on the riskiest of the c.50,000 health and social-care
establishments that it
regulates (5iv:7). As of 2011, some 36 regulators, with
responsibilities ranging from the
environment, financial services and football licensing to charities,
equality and human rights, had
filed Hampton Implementation Review Reports with the Department for
Business, Innovation &
Skills (5vi).
Second, KCRM has also actively supported several government departments
in their
implementation of the Hampton Principles through targeted research,
training support and strategic
advice. Government commissioned research by Fairman, Howard and Yapp,
which identified the
need for risk-based targeting of regulatory enforcement activities (3ii;3viii;3xi;3xv;3xvi),
provided
the main evidence base for the UK Food Standards Agency's (FSA) focus on
compliance drivers
and better use of tailored messages and guidance in its 'Enforcement and
Compliance Strategy
2010-15'. Howard also led an FSA Social Science Committee working group in
2010 on the risk
factors shaping the prevalence of foodborne disease, the findings of which
significantly focused the
prevention efforts of the FSA's Listeria Risk Management Programme
(5a). KCRM research has
also underpinned policy learning and training. For example, the Better
Regulation Executive
recommends the monograph (3iii) from Rothstein's ESRC-funded
research on risk regulation
regimes as the standard academic text on risk and regulation for civil
servants (5i:9). Defra's Better
Regulation training programme has also drawn on KCRM research it
commissioned from Rothstein
on the use of risk-based policy tools across Defra (5xiii).
Finally, building on an earlier successful
collaboration (3i), the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
commissioned Löfstedt to undertake
research and provide strategic advice to improve HSE's risk communication
practices (5iii).
Third, Löfstedt's work on occupational health and safety led to his
appointment to chair his
2011 Independent Review of Health and Safety Regulation (5xii).
His evidence-based review has
had a substantial impact on that regulatory domain by persuading the UK
Government to maintain
and strengthen its use of risk-based approaches. That achievement was
significant in a climate
where politicians and media commentators commonly disparage `elf`n'safety
madness'. Even
David Cameron, before becoming Prime Minister, complained that the UK's
`over-the-top' health
and safety culture had created a `stultifying blanket of bureaucracy,
suspicion and fear' (5ii).
Drawing on detailed research, including the advice of Rothstein (5xii:103),
Löfstedt concluded that
there was `no case for radically altering current health and safety
legislation' (5xii:1). Nevertheless,
he identified five ways in which the risk-basis of the regime could be
improved (5xii:8-11). His
recommendations gained support amongst all stakeholders and HM Government
committed to
implementing them in their entirety (5vii:9-15), as evidenced
below:
1. Exempt the self-employed from health and safety law when their work
activities pose no risk of
harm to others.
- Status: The Deregulation Bill, announced in the Queen's Speech
in May 2013, will implement
this recommendation, exempting up to 800,000 people from the law.
2. Review all 53 Approved Codes of Practice (ACOP) to ensure that
unnecessary complexity does
not stand in the way of employers understanding and meeting their legal
obligations.
- Status: An HSE consultation on 25 June 2012 set out its
proposals for the revision,
consolidation or withdrawal of 15 of its ACOPs for delivery by 2013 and
proposed a programme
for the future review of the remaining ACOPs.
3. Simplify health and safety law by reducing the number of
regulations by more than 50% and by
revoking regulations that have no impact on health and safety outcomes.
- Status: Twenty-one statutory instruments have already been
revoked and a consultation on the
revocation of a further twelve ends on 12 July 2013.
4. Develop a binding national code of inspection and enforcement that
is consistent and targeted
towards the most risky businesses.
- Status: The Local Authority National Enforcement Code, which
sets out a risk-based approach
to targeting health and safety interventions, was published on 29 May
2013.
5. Review the scope for giving employers the right to contest civil
liability claims when they have
taken reasonable precautions to control workplace risks.
- Status: The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, which
received Royal Assent on 25 April
2013, changes health and safety legislation such that `strict liability'
provisions no longer hold
employers to be in breach of their duties when they have done everything
that is reasonably
practicable and foreseeable to protect their employees.
Löfstedt was commissioned by HM Government to undertake a follow-up
independent One-Year-
On Assessment and Mark Hoban MP, the current Minister of Employment,
was `encouraged by the
positive endorsement [...Löfstedt gave...] of the Government's progress
with health and safety
reform' (5ix: foreword). Chris Grayling MP, the former Minister of
Employment, stated that `by
accepting the recommendations of Professor Löfstedt, we are putting common
sense back at the
heart of health and safety' (5viii; see also 5b and 5c).
Sources to corroborate the impact
all available on request
Individuals
5a Head, Local Authority Audit and Liaison Division, Food
Standards Agency
5b Chief Executive, Health and Safety Executive
5c Minister for Employment
Sources
5i Better Regulation Executive. Life in BRE: My
Directorate-RID.
5ii BBC. 2009. Cameron says health and safety rules 'over the
top', 1.12.2009,
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8388025.stm
[Accessed June 2013]
5iii Bouder, F. and Löfstedt, R. 2010. Improving Health and
Safety: An analysis of the HSE's risk
communication in the 21st Century. London: HSE books
5iv Care Quality Commission. 2012. Proposals for the
Compliance and Enforcement Model from
April 2012, Paper No. CM/01/12/10, Agenda Item 10, Minutes of Public
Board Meeting, 15
February 2012. www.cqc.org.uk/public/about-us/our-people/board-members/board-meetings
[Accessed June 2013]
5v Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.
2007. Regulators' Compliance
Code: A Statutory Code of Practice for Regulators. www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45019.pdf
[Accessed June 2013]
5vi Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Hampton
Implementation Review Reports.
www.bis.gov.uk/policies/better-regulation/improving-regulatory-delivery/implementing-principles-of-better-regulation/reviewing-regulators/hampton-implementation-review-reports
[Accessed June 2013]
5vii Department for Work and Pensions. 2011. The Government
Response to the Löfstedt Review.
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/66794/Löfstedt
-report-response.pdf [Accessed June 2013]
5viii Department for Work and Pensions. 28.11.2011. Report
calls for 1 million self-employed to be
exempt from health and safety law. Press Release. www.gov.uk/government/news/report-calls-for-one-million-self-employed-to-be-exempt-from-health-and-safety-law
[Accessed June 2013]
5ix Department for Work and Pensions. 2013. A progress report
on implementation of health and
safety reforms
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/92634/progress-report-health-safety-reforms-feb-2013.pdf
[Accessed June 2013]
5x Hampton, P. 2005. Reducing Administrative Burdens:
Effective Inspection and Enforcement ,
London: HM Treasury
5xi HM Treasury, Better Regulation Executive, Cabinet Office.
2006. Implementing Hampton: from
enforcement to compliance. London: HMSO
5xii Löfstedt, R. 2011. Reclaiming Health and Safety for All:
An independent review of health and
safety legislation. London: Department of Work and Pensions
5xiii Rothstein, H. and Downer, J. 2008. Risk in
Policy-making: Managing the risks of risk
governance. Report for the Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs. London:
King's College London. Supplementary Report: Rothstein, H. and Downer, J.
2008. Risk in
Policy-making. Project case study: Heather & Grass Burning.
Report for Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. London: King's College London.