Re-igniting R&D for antibiotics
Submitting Institution
London School of Economics & Political ScienceUnit of Assessment
Social Work and Social PolicySummary Impact Type
PoliticalResearch Subject Area(s)
Medical and Health Sciences: Public Health and Health Services
Economics: Applied Economics
Summary of the impact
Millions of cases of multi-drug resistance bacterial infection occur each
year. Yet the pharmaceutical industry has all but ceased investing in
antibiotic development due to a combination of low profits and lack of
appropriate incentives. In her 2011 Annual Report, the Chief Medical
Officer called for more attention to be given to an antimicrobial
resistance strategy for the UK and worldwide. The Unit's work analysed the
nature of the incentives necessary to get antibiotic R&D going again.
In particular it served as the basis for an urgent request by the EU
Council for action and sparked the formation of the critical
`transatlantic taskforce' (TATFAR): the first major international
collaboration to tackle antibiotic resistance. Recommendations from the
work served as the foundation for an EU-level public/private partnership
and for US regulatory reform.
Underpinning research
Research Insights and Outputs: the Unit built up a substantial
strand of work from the mid-1990s on possible incentives to promote
research on areas of critical unmet medical need [1, 2]. Subsequent work
on different ways of stimulating the development of new vaccines for
neglected diseases [3] attracted the attention of the Swedish Government,
which made the problem of antibiotics one of its priorities for its
Presidency of the European Union (in 2009). The Swedish Ministry of Health
and Social Affairs asked LSE Health to explore ways of promoting the
development of new priority antibiotics (€120,000 grant).
The resulting LSE report [4] explored in depth the market failures in
respect of producing new antibiotics and analysed different incentive
frameworks to develop them. The report analysed over 20 different
incentive frameworks to stimulate the production of new antibiotics,
focusing on both `push' and `pull' mechanisms. Push mechanisms reduce the
costs of the R&D process for research groups or (usually smaller)
companies (e.g. via start-up funds). Pull mechanisms promise (usually
large) companies a reward if goals regarding a new product are achieved,
with the aim of getting companies with experience in antibiotic
development to go through the full set of research and development stages.
The Unit's research stressed the importance of possible combinations of
push and pull incentives, setting out the expected magnitude of impact and
overall financial and political feasibility for each incentive, and
recommended policy responses at the national and international (e.g. EU)
level.
In particular, the Report made specific recommendations on:
(i) The need for new approaches to risk sharing on the part of the key
actors — governments and private producers of antibiotics. The Report
attached considerable importance to the potential of these public/private
partnerships at key stages of the R&D process. On the `pull' side,
these partnerships would specify and reward the development of goals for
antibiotic development, while on the `push' side they would seek to reduce
the costs of the R&D process, particularly of clinical trials.
(ii) The importance of regulatory reform that would act as an appropriate
incentive, for example, protecting intellectual property for an extended
period. This in turn would protect against market competition (something
that was particularly important for US companies). The Report called
attention to the way in which such extensions are particularly useful for
drugs like antibiotics, where greater rewards are needed to spur the full
development of the drug (a push factor), but where linking the reward to
the long-term efficacy of the drug is also important (a pull factor).
In 2010 and 2013 the research was published in high-impact journals [5,6]
and was expanded to include a closer comparative analysis using 20
essential criteria deriving from the various stakeholder perspectives
(long-term public health, regulatory authorities, industry) [7]. In
particular this research proposed a new incentive that combined the
critical elements inherent in existing (successful) regulatory incentives
with those that respond to the specific needs of antibiotics market, that
is, incentives intended to limit over-marketing and over-consumption of
any new drug in order to slow the growth of resistance over the
medium-to-long-term.
Key Researchers: Professor Elias Mossialos has been at LSE from
1992. Research Officers: Chantal Morel at LSE from 2009; Suzanne Edwards
at LSE from 2009; and Julia Berenson at LSE from 2009. Research Associate:
Marin Gemmill-Toyama has been at LSE from 2003-9.
References to the research
[1] Mossialos, E., Kanavos, P., Abel-Smith, B. (1994) Policy Options
for Pharmaceutical Research and Development in the European Community.
Brussels: European Parliament — Science and Technology Options
Assessment Programme. Available from LSE.
[2] Mrazek, M., Mossialos, E. (2003) Stimulating pharmaceutical research
and development for neglected diseases, Health Policy 64 (1). pp.
75-88. LSE Research Online number 20087.
[3] Brogan, D, Mossialos, E (2006) Applying the concepts of financial
options to stimulate vaccine development, Nature Reviews, 5,
641-647. LSE Research Online number 19345.
[5] Morel C, Mossialos E (2010) Stoking the antibiotic pipeline. British
Medical Journal, 340, 115-118. LSE Research Online number 28555.
[7] Morel, C and Mossialos,E `Incentives for promoting R&D in novel
antibiotics: How do proposed incentive mechanisms compare according to key
criteria?' 23 May 2011, ReAct conference on Collaboration for Innovation —
The Urgent Need for New Antibiotics, Brussels. Available from LSE.
Evidence of quality: References [2], [3], [5] and [6] are
peer-reviewed journal articles. Grant awarded to LSE Health (€120,000) for
the antibiotics project by the Government of Sweden: Study on
antibiotics resistance and incentives to develop new medicines,
October 2008 - November 2009.
Details of the impact
Nature of the Impact: As the sole contribution to 2009 "The
Stockholm Conference" of the Swedish Presidency, the LSE's Report [4]
served as the basis for extensive discussion that led to the EU Council
request that the Commission "within 24 months, develop a comprehensive
action plan, with concrete proposals concerning incentives to develop new
effective antibiotics" [A]. From this stage on there was extensive
engagement with a wide variety of stakeholders. The LSE Report served as a
pre-conference document for review by leading US academics, industry
representatives from both small and large companies and associations
(including AstraZeneca, Basilea Pharmaceutica, and the European Federation
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations), government and regulatory
officials (including those from DG Enterprise at the EC; UK Health
Protection Agency), and key representatives of international and
non-governmental organizations (including the WHO). The importance of the
report was acknowledged by the Swedish Ministry for Health and Social
Affairs [B], and was officially presented by the Swedish Presidency of the
Council of the European Union in the latter half of the Stockholm
conference. It was published in 2010 by the WHO as a book [2].
Following the Conference, the Swedish Prime Minister proposed to the US
President the formation of a Transatlantic Taskforce with the European
Union (Transatlantic Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance — TATFAR) to
encourage global research and development of new antibiotics, to address
antimicrobial resistance, and to push for legislation. The formation of
this taskforce — signed into effect by Swedish Prime Minister Reinfeldt of
Sweden and US President Obama — was explicitly intended to build on the
LSE Report [C]. The LSE work was also cited extensively in the TATFAR's
findings [D].
Further evidence of engagement with the recommendations of the LSE Report
comes from Professor Otto Cars, Director of the Swedish Strategic
Programme Against Antibiotic Resistance, who in 2010 described the work as
"pioneering" and emphasized that it would have "a marked influence on
future development in the field"[E]. In 2009 and 2010 the LSE work also
received further significant international media coverage [F, G]. And in
the April 2011 edition of the journal Nature, the authors of a
paper on the need for action in re-igniting antibiotic research concluded
that the LSE recommendations for a "push-pull" response are a "clear
front-runner" in the possible courses of action." [H]
Two of the LSE's specific recommendations have been implemented. First,
the LSE research was presented on more than ten occasions to key
stakeholders in Sweden, London, Washington DC and Brussels over the period
2009-2011, focusing on the need for public-private risk-sharing at
critical stages of antibiotic research and development, particularly that
of clinical trials. In early 2012 the public-private partnership between
the European Commission and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations (EFPIA) — the Innovative Medical Initiative
(IMI) — announced an (equally) shared commitment of €220 million for the
development of new antibiotics, intended to facilitate partnerships
between academic and industry researchers focused on new antibiotics and
to share the risks of clinical trials [I].
Second, the recommendation for regulatory reform to increase the rewards
to the industry by giving a greater measure of market protection via
intellectual property extensions was discussed and cited in expert
testimony given in the United States Congress in 2010 and again in 2012
[J]. Such testimonies were crucial to the passing of bipartisan
legislation in mid-2012, which established greater market protection for
vital new antibiotics reaching the market via intellectual property
extensions for data generated. (The "GAIN Act" of S. 3187, 112th Cong.,
2nd Sess.)
In addition, in 2011 the research provoked discussion in the arena of
national defence in the US [K, L]. It was presented within an expert panel
at the US Institute of Medicine's workshop on medical counter measures to
terrorism that is generally accepted to have opened the door for the U.S.
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) — best
known for developing vaccines and therapies as medical countermeasures to
bioterrorism threats — to award a series of contracts for antibiotic
research. The work was also picked up by major industry players who had
not been part of the original "Stockholm" group — demonstrating wider
industry acceptance of report findings and recommendations [M].
Today the debate over a new incentive structure to promote research on
and development of new antibiotics is still underway in the US and within
the European institutions. The work of the Unit has been the first to
explore how this might be done and continues to lead the debate. It is
undertaking new research funded by the Pew Charitable Trust in late 2012
($150,000) on how to disentangle the supply- and demand-side bottlenecks
currently preventing badly needed diagnostics for bacterial infections
from making it to the market.
Wider Implications: Millions of cases of resistance to antibiotics
occur each year, adding to the burden of disease. It is estimated that
annual hospital deaths from antibiotic resistant pathogens already tops
25,000 patients in the EU alone. The Unit's work has helped to overcome
some of the traditional market failures associated with the development of
new antibiotics and has contributed to important policy changes in Europe
and the USA. By improving incentives to R&D in new antibiotics, the
Unit's research should assist with reducing levels of both morbidity and
mortality in Europe and beyond.
Sources to corroborate the impact
All Sources listed below can also be seen at: https://apps.lse.ac.uk/impact/case-study/view/60
[A] Council of the European Union, `Council Conclusions on innovative
incentives for effective Antibiotics', 1 December 2009, para 13
acknowledges the LSE Report. Source file:
https://apps.lse.ac.uk/impact/download/file/1411
[B] Corroborating letter from the Swedish Secretary of State. This source
is confidential.
[C] Memorandum from the Swedish Presidency of the European Union on
Antimicrobial Resistance, 23 September 2009. Communication cable:
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09STOCKHOLM604
[D] Transatlantic Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance: Recommendations
for future collaboration between the U.S. and EU, 2011.
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/TATFAR/Documents/210911_TATFAR_Re
port.pdf
[E] Burki, T. (2010) Push and pull of antibiotic development, The
Lancet Infectious Diseases, 10, 1, 12-13. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1473309909703421
[F] Harrell, E. (2009) The desperate need for new antibiotics, TIME,
1 October 2009.
http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1926853,00.html
[G] Tutton, M. (2009) New
research warns penicillin 'becoming obsolete'. CNN, 26 January 2010,
published on 1 October, 2009.
[H] Cooper, M. and Shlaes D. (2011) Fix the antibiotics in pipelines, Nature,
472, 32.
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v472/n7341/full/472032a.html
[I] `EFPIA contributes to IMI €223.7 million programme to tackle
Antibiotic resistance'. Brussels: European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations, 24 May 2012.
http://www.efpia.eu/mediaroom/67/43/EFPIA-contributes-to-IMI-223-7-million-programme-to-tackle-Antibiotic-resistance
[J] Expert testimony. US Congress House Committee on Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Health. Washington DC: US Congress; 9 June 2010 and 8
March 2012 (B. Spellberg, Infectious Disease Society of America, expert
testimony and B. Eistenstein Senior Vice President, Scientific Affairs,
Cubist Pharmaceuticals Inc.) Source file: https://apps.lse.ac.uk/impact/download/file/1416
https://apps.lse.ac.uk/impact/download/file/1417
[K] Institute of Medicine workshop on Countermeasures Enterprise, held in
Washington DC (presented by teleconference), 23 February 2010. Source
file:
https://apps.lse.ac.uk/impact/download/file/1418
[L] Platsis G (Director of the Research Center at the National Defense
Foundation) & Kavanagh S. (2011) Keeping Pace: Protecting Our Troops
and Our Population by Incentivizing Antimicrobial Research and
Development. Washington DC: National Defense Foundation. Source file:
https://apps.lse.ac.uk/impact/download/file/1420
[M] Merck & Co., Inc. Public Policy Statement: Antimicrobial
Resistance, September 2011. Source file: https://apps.lse.ac.uk/impact/download/file/1421