Influencing Occupational Pensions Policy - The Pension Protection Policy
Submitting Institution
University of WarwickUnit of Assessment
Business and Management StudiesSummary Impact Type
EconomicResearch Subject Area(s)
Economics: Applied Economics
Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services: Banking, Finance and Investment
Summary of the impact
Neuberger, together with David McCarthy (Imperial), who, in their earlier
work, had raised concerns about the sustainability of the Pensions
Protection Fund (PPF), were commissioned by the Fund to conduct research
on alternative levy structures. This led to the development of a new
risk-based levy structure, which was implemented over the years 2012-2013.
This research and its resulting impact have not only shaped how the PPF
operates in ensuring the levy's burden is fairly shared, but has also
benefited all UK holders of occupation based pensions and the taxpayer at
large.
Underpinning research
The original Pensions Protection Fund adopted a new levy framework in
2011, implemented from 2012 onwards, benchmarked against Neuberger and
McCarthy's model of a theoretically fair levy, taking on board earlier
criticisms of the original plan by Neuberger.
The PPF was designed to secure occupational pensions in the event that a
sponsor company becomes insolvent and the pension scheme is underfunded
and unable to meet its accrued obligations. However, this raised the
question as to whether the PPF was itself sustainable. Pension insolvency
and underfunding are very volatile. For example, aggregate pension scheme
funding (as estimated by the PPF 7800 index) fluctuated by over £240
billion between 2009 and 2010 (PPF 2010 Combined Annex). Hence, the
demands on the scheme, and the ultimate burden on taxpayers could, in the
event of unexpected crises, be very large. Neuberger and McCarthy argued
that at the time the original legislation was promulgated (Hansard 9
September 2004; http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/grand_committee_report/2004/sep/09/official-report-of-the-grand-committee),
demands on the PPF were likely to be uneven, with intense demands at
particular points in time; in a worst-case scenario claims on the PPF
would rise to 30 times the average, necessitating some 24 years reserves
of annual PPF contributions if a substantial taxpayer bailout was to be
avoided (Financial Times 16 May 2005).
Initial research co-led by Neuberger and McCarthy, both Principal
Investigators, aimed to establish the sustainability of the PPF and its
premium levy structure. Neuberger and McCarthy developed two economic
models which identified and quantified some of the main policy issues
involved in the PPF. Initial analysis was based on a simple economic model
of a generic pension guarantee fund. The research model was extended with
the development of a second, more sophisticated economic model. This
employed a sophisticated structural model of the firm in order to model
stochastic (random unpredictable) default rates. Based on the rationale
that a downturn in equity markets would increase pension fund deficits and
firm insolvencies, the stochastic model showed greater volatility in the
claims on the PPF. Neuberger and McCarthy's model showed that risk-based
premiums would have limited impact on moral hazard (i.e., being more
willing to take a risk because the costs of doing so will be borne by
others) for occupational pension schemes most at risk of defaulting. The
study served as a critique of the PPF initial system of levies, contending
that it would not work without an implicit government guarantee and
adequate funding of pension schemes covered by the insurance scheme. This
research led to public debate and was soon proved prescient when, in 2008,
the PPF was exposed to the consequences of the financial crisis, prompting
calls by a range of organisations for the government to act as a
guarantor. Instead, mechanisms were put in place for the fund to cope
better with adverse circumstances: Neuberger and McCarthy were
commissioned by the PPF Committee to examine how the concept of fairness
could be modelled theoretically to support them in the development of a
fairer risk-based levy (RBL). Based on their findings, the PPF moved to
adopt a new levy framework to cope better with unforeseen economic shocks.
The new levy framework was rolled out in 2012-2013.
References to the research
1. McCarthy, D. and Neuberger, A. (2005), The Pension Protection Fund,, Fiscal
Studies, Vol 26, No. 2, pp. 139-167 [ABS grade 2]. Peer reviewed
journal article DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5890.2005.00008.x
2. McCarthy, D. and Neuberger, A. (2005), Pricing Pension Insurance: The
Proposed Levy Structure for the Pension Protection Fund', Fiscal
Studies 26, No. 4; pp. 471-489. [ABS grade 2]. Peer reviewed
journal article. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5890.2005.00020.x
3. Neuberger, A. (2006) Chapter 7: `The UK Approach to Insuring Defined
Benefit Pension Plans'in Restructuring Retirement Risks.
Blitzstein, D., Mitchell, O.S. and Utkus, S.P. (eds.). Oxford University
Press: Oxford. Chapter contribution to edited volume DOI:
10.1093/0199204659.003.0007
4. McCarthy, D. and Neuberger, A. (2008) Chapter 10: `Pricing Defined
Benefit Pension Insurance', in Pension Fund Governance: A Global
Perspective on Financial Regulation, Evans, J., Orszag, M. and
Piggott, J (eds). Chapter contribution to edited volume DOI:
10.4337/9781781007662.00021
6. McCarthy, D. and Neuberger, A. (2006), `The Pension Protection Fund'
in Retirement Provision in Scary Markets, Bateman. H. (ed). Edward
Elgar. Chapter contribution to edited volume
Details of the impact
Neuberger and McCarthy's research has been recognised as being of
practical and political importance to the UK pension policy context and
has directly informed reforms to the way in which the PPF is managed. Its
primary impact has been to provide the basis for an adjusted pension
levies structure, which was implemented over the period 2012-2013, and
which has placed the PPF on a more sustainable footing. The research has
also improved practitioner and pension decision makers' understanding of
critical pension issues, regulations and their potential implications.
The research has engaged with by a range of key stakeholders. There were
seven principal beneficiaries of the research:
- The Pension Protection Fund
- The Department of Work and Pensions
- Parliamentarians in the UK House of Commons
- Pension fund consultants and trustee boards advising on strategic
asset allocation decisions.
- Firms contributing to the Fund.
- Those dependent on pensions from schemes covered by the PPF.
- UK taxpayers.
Based on their initial research on the PPF, Neuberger and McCarthy argued
that the scheme might require a future government bailout, unless its levy
structure was re-visited. With the 2008 economic downturn and subsequent
concerted financial shocks, the PPF was exposed to a number of the issues
predicted in Neuberger and McCarthy's earlier research, with a range of
organisations calling for the state to guarantee the Fund, again as
predicted by their work.
As acknowledged experts (inter alia, Specialist Advisors to the
Parliamentary Select Committee on Work and Pensions, 2007), in 2008
Neuberger and McCarthy were commissioned by the PPF to examine how the
concept of fairness could be modelled theoretically to support them in the
development of a fairer risk based levy (RBL) more closely aligned with
market rates and preceding PPF experiences. The emphasis on fairness was
of particular importance, given that if levies were seen as unscientific
or unfair, this might drive many employers to close their schemes, leaving
a disproportionate amount of weak schemes implicitly relying on PPF
bailouts. More specifically, the PPF's Steering Group agreed on the
principle that a fair levy was one where contributions were commensurate
to the risks an individual scheme posed to the PPF. The PPF's `Evaluating
the Fairness of the Risk-based Levy (including Combined Annex)' policy
document was published in conjunction with the 2010 Pension Protection
Levy consultation document, and formed the basis of the subsequent changes
to the levy system, implemented during the period 2012-2013, benchmarked
against Neuberger and McCarthy's model of a theoretically fair levy. The
Annex Document to the PPF's New Framework Document outlines the changed
framework, and explicitly acknowledges the debt the changes owe to
Neuberger and McCarthy, noting that their research constructed a
theoretical measure to assess the cost of future pension scheme claims. In
turn, this served as a basis for measuring fairness of alternative levy
designs, including the one ultimately adopted.
The research has had a further impact on policy through improving the
base of parliamentary understanding and knowledge of the PPF and its
consequences. In July 2012 the House of Commons published a document for
Members of Parliament on the PPF (Thurley 2012), drawing on Neuberger and
McCarthy's original (2005) research. It highlighted the broader range of
risks posed by the PPF to the public purse, imparting the reforms with a
measure of urgency.
Sources to corroborate the impact
-
Thurley, D. (2012) House of Commons Library: Pension Protection
Fund Report (July): The report highlights the risks posed to the
public purse by the PPI, informed by, and making direct reference to the
work of Neuberger and McCarthy (report, p. 32).Online, available from: http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03917.pdf
-
Consultation Document: The Pension Protection Levy: A New Framework
Including the Combined Annex (October 2010) (Report). This
corroborates research impact on the decision making process and the
subsequent proposals of the PPF Committee in formulating and assessing
fair and alternative levy designs which in turn, were adopted in the new
levy system phased in from 2012-2013. The Pension Protection
Levy: A New Framework Consultation document online,
available from: http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/DocumentLibrary/Documents/levy_consultation_oct10.pdf
Combined Annex online, available from:
http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/DocumentLibrary/Documents/levy_consultation_annex_oct10.pdf