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Research undertaken at the University of East Anglia (UEA) has identified whether consumers are likely to switch supplier, whether they are likely to get a good deal, and how companies are likely to respond to specific regulatory intervention. Such research findings challenge regulators to make better decisions. An appropriate regulatory framework leads to better decisions by consumers, helping markets to work better, and resulting in lower prices and bills. This is particularly critical in the energy and water sector, which are of crucial importance to each of the 25 million households in the UK, and where implementation of some of these research findings could lead to reductions of 6% in household energy bills (which translates to a total saving of over £2.1 billion a year).
The banking crisis that followed the collapse of Northern Rock in 2007 resulted in an urgent need to inject liquidity into the financial system. In order to resolve these issues, the Bank of England asked Professor Klemperer, an expert in auction theory, to help re-dseign its long-term market operations to allow the Bank of England to auction loans backed by financial collateral of varying quality. Since 2010, this has been adopted as the Bank of England's standard mechanism for its long-term repurchase operations. The potential impact of the new auction design extends beyond the Bank of England to other central banks, private industry and to industry regulators.
Professor Michael Waterson demonstrated how two consumer activities — search and switching — are necessary if competition is to benefit consumers. He showed how search and switching costs inhibit the competitive process; highlighted how firms increase these costs in retail, banking, insurance and energy markets, and recommended government measures to empower consumers. Regulators around the world have used Waterson's research to enhance the consumer benefits from competition. Professor Gregory Crawford also analysed switching costs, estimating the costs of automatically renewable contracts in the UK telephone market. Based on this analysis, Ofcom banned rollover contracts for all residential and small business customers of voice telephone and broadband services, reducing households' and small businesses' switching costs by at least £340 million/year.
The Coalition government's manifesto commitments to remove compulsion in the annuity market necessitated a decision about a Minimum Income Requirement (MIR). Cannon's contribution to the government consultation played a significant role in setting the MIR. Previous research by Cannon had shown that the UK compulsory-purchase annuity market was efficient because compulsion expanded market size (more than half of all annuities are sold in the UK) and reduced selection effects. This research enabled the government to justify retaining an element of compulsion. The precise level of the MIR used in the 2011 Finance Bill was based upon the methodology proposed by Cannon.
The methodological and applied work on micro-econometric demand analysis outlined here has been repeatedly used by the UK Competition Commission (since 2002) and the Co-operation & Competition Panel (now Monitor) of the UK Department of Health (since 2009) in their respective competition analyses, and by the Hong Kong Consumer Council in its Public Estate Supermarket Study (since 2011). It contributed to the European Commission White Paper on the quantification of antitrust damages (2010), underpinning some of the econometric methodology proposed there to assess cartel damages in EU Courts. Beckert's work in the area of micro-econometric demand analysis connects micro-economic demand theory with various econometric methodologies to assess demand-side substitution in the presence of taste heterogeneity. His research is disseminated through articles in peer-reviewed academic journals, policy articles, and through consultation by antitrust authorities, think tanks and economic consultancies.
Derek Bunn has led a research programme on understanding competition, market evolution, and prices in electricity markets. He and other researchers in the LBS Energy Markets Group have modelled production facilities in detail, their explicit ownerships, and the price-formation process. Their use of computational learning provides subtle insights which have eluded conventional approaches. The LBS group was the first to do this, and the approach is now widely applied. Relevance of the work is recognised via funding from major energy companies and research organisations. In terms of external impact, this work has informed extensive advice to several government inquiries, stimulated further research, and is actively used by commericial businesses.
Regulating telecommunications has been difficult for policy-makers, who must balance freedom for business operation with fairness and value for consumers. Termination rates — the cost of ending phone calls using other networks — have been particularly contentious.
Professor Valletti's work helped regulators, including Ofcom, to model the processes involved and thereby improve regulatory pricing guidelines.
By developing a new theory of regulation — how dynamic incentives price regulation — his research has influenced policy in both UK and international telecommunications markets.
Stephan's research identifies difficulties with a dishonesty element in the offence of agreeing to fix prices with a competitor. It has had impact in the UK and Australia. In 2011, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills published a consultation document, citing Stephan's findings in justifying proposals to drop dishonesty in favour of a new cartel offence. In Australia, a draft criminal offence which required dishonesty was proposed in 2008. Following submissions by academics and practitioners which cited Stephan's work, the dishonesty element was dropped. A 2009 Australian Senate Standing Committee report supported this change, quoting one of Stephan's papers.